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I.

INTRODUCTION

This appeal relates to two competing lienhold interests in a failed real estate
development project in Coeur d' Alene, Idaho, known as Black Rock North. The appellant
American Bank ("American Bank") provided financing to the owner ofthe project, BRN
Development, Inc. ("BRN"). American Bank secured its money lent with a mortgage recorded
against Black Rock North. BRN defaulted on its loan with American Bank, whereupon
American Bank filed this action to judicially foreclose its mortgage.
The respondent Wadsworth Golf Construction Company of the Southwest
("Wadsworth") was the general contractor responsible for the construction of the golf course that
encompassed one aspect of Black Rock North. BRN failed to pay Wadsworth for some of
Wadsworth's work on the project. As a result, Wadsworth filed a claim oflien against Black
Rock North for its unpaid work on the project.
American Bank named Wadsworth as a defendant in this action for the purpose of
foreclosing out Wadsworth's junior lienhold interest. In the proceedings below, the district court
determined as a factual matter that Wadsworth's claim of lien was subordinate to American
Bank's mortgage. Additionally, the district court entered a decree of foreclosure that resulted in
American Bank obtaining a sheriff s deed to the property by American Bank credit bidding the
amount that BRN owed to American Bank, with no surplus proceeds to pay any junior creditors.
Notwithstanding the subordination of Wadsworth's claim oflien and that there were no surplus
proceeds from the foreclosure to pay any junior creditors, the district court held American Bank
liable for the entirety of Wadsworth's claim oflien because American Bank posted a lien bond to

1
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remove Wadsworth's lien from the Black Rock North property. As a result of the judgment
entered by the district court, American Bank and the bond surety are jointly and severally liable
to Wadsworth for a judgment in the total amount of$2,425,483.50.
American Bank now appeals the rulings and judgment entered by the district
court. American Bank respectfully asserts that the district court misapplied the lien bond statute
governing American Bank's liability to Wadsworth. l In sum, by posting the lien bond, American
Bank and the bond surety obligated themselves to pay Wadsworth that sum of money that
Wadsworth would have recovered by foreclosing its claim oflien against the Black Rock North
property. As it pertains to this action, because Wadsworth would not have recovered anything
by foreclosing its lien against the property, the district court should not have allowed Wadsworth
to recover anything from the lien release bond. At best for Wadsworth, this matter should be
remanded to give Wadsworth an opportunity to prove the amount it would have recovered by
foreclosing its lien against the property, after considering the priority of American Bank's
mortgage.
Alternatively, given that Wadsworth violated the Idaho Contractor Registration
Ace by (1) failing to register under the Act at all times it performed work on the project and
(2) engaging unregistered subcontractors to work on the project, the district court should have

Idaho's Lien Bond Statute, Idaho Code Sections 45-518 through 45-524, is attached to
this Brief as Addendum A.
1

Idaho's Contractor Registration Act ("ICRA"), Idaho Code Sections 54-5201 through
54-5219, is attached to this Brief as Addendum B.
2

2
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dismissed Wadsworth's counterclaim, including its claim to recover against the lien bond, in its
entirety.

II.
A.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Proceedings Relating to Underlying Dispute Between American Bank and
Wadsworth.
1.

On April 1, 2009, American Bank filed this action to foreclose its

mortgage that secured BRN's debt obligation to American Bank. Clerk's Record ("R") Vol. 1,
pp. 110-33. American Bank named a number of defendants who filed competing claims against
the Black Rock North property. One of those defendants was Wadsworth, who filed a claim of
lien against the Black Rock North property on January 6,2009 (hereinafter the real property
upon which American Bank and Wadsworth hold competing liens shall be referred to as the
"Property"). In its Complaint, American Bank asserted that its mortgage was prior and superior
to Wadsworth's claim of lien and the other competing liens recorded against the Property, and
American Bank sought to foreclose all such junior liens. Id., p. 120, ~ 2. The principal amount
that American Bank sought to recover by the foreclosure of its mortgage was $14,600,000.00.

Id., pp. 119-20, ~~ 1-3.
2.

On May 12, 2009, Wadsworth filed a counterclaim against American

Bank, wherein Wadsworth sought to foreclose its claim oflien for its unpaid work on the Black
Rock North project. R Vol. 1, pp. 159-209. In such counterclaim, Wadsworth asserted that its
claim oflien was prior and superior to' American Bank's mortgage. Id., pp. 168-69, § XL. The
principal amount that Wadsworth sought to recover through the foreclosure of its claim of lien
was $2,329,439.72. Id. at p. 170, ~~ 1-3.

3
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3.

On April 7, 2010, American Bank purchased a Release of Mechanic's

Lien Bond ("Lien Release Bond") for the purpose of bonding around Wadsworth's claim oflien,
as Wadsworth was at that time the only lienholder claiming priority to American Bank's
mortgage. R Vol. 4, pp. 0848-88. The Lien Release Bond identifies American Bank as the
principal posting the bond and International Fidelity Insurance Company ("International
Fidelity") as the surety. Id., p. 848. The bond issued by International Fidelity contains the
following language mandated by Idaho Code Section 45-519:
WHEREAS, American Bank, desires to give a bond for releasing
the following described real property from that certain claim of
mechanic's lien in the sum of $2,329,439.72, recorded January 6,
2009, in the office of the recorder in Kootenai County, Idaho: See
Exhibit A for Legal Description
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned principal and surety do
hereby obligate themselves to Wadsworth Golf Construction
Company of the Southwest, the claimant named in the mechanic's
lien, under the conditions prescribed by sections 45-518 through
45-524, Idaho Code, inclusive, in the sum of Three Million Four
Hundred Ninety Four Thousand One Hundred Fifty Nine and
58/100 Dollars ($3,494,159.58), from which sum they will pay the
claimant such amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may
adjudge to have been secured by his lien, with interest, costs and
attorney's fees.
R Vol. 4, p. 848.
4.

On April 14,2010, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-518, et seq.

("Idaho's Lien Bond Statute"), American Bank petitioned the district court for the release of
Wadsworth's mechanic's lien against the Property upon the posting of the Lien Release Bond
with the district court. R Vol. 4, pp. 0670-0762.

4
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5.

Wadsworth never filed any written objections to American Bank's petition

for release of Wadsworth's claim of lien upon the posting of the Lien Release Bond. See
Reporter's Transcript on Appeal ("Tr.") at 7: 17 - 11 :15. Rather, Wadsworth stipulated to the
entry ofthe order that released its lien against the Property upon the posting of the Lien Release
Bond. !d. Such stipulated order, entered by the court on April 27, 2010 (R Vol. 4, pp. 0774-76),
provides:
•

"Petitioner American Bank having presented satisfactory proof as required
by Idaho Code Section 45-521 that a bond complying with the form
prescribed by Idaho Code Section 45-519 was procured and paid for .... "
Id., p. 774, ~ (b).

•

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does order, that the: (a) Notice of
Claim of Lien filed by Wadsworth on January 6,2009, and recorded as
Instrument No. 2191381000, in the records of the Kootenai County
Recorder, against and the Real Property ... [is] hereby released of record
for all purposes, but only as to the real property described in Exhibit D, to
the same extent as if such liens had been released of record by
Wadsworth ... , and if such claims are asserted by motion pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 45-523 or in an independent action pursuant to Idaho
Code Section 45-522, the bond filed herein shall be subject to the claims
that would otherwise constitute liens against the above-described
property." Id., pp. 775-76.

6.

On July 21, 2010, American Bank moved for summary judgment,

claiming there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the priority of American Bank's
mortgage over Wadsworth's claim oflien. R VoL 8, pp. 1703-34.
7.

On November 12,2010, Wadsworth responded to American Bank's

motion for summary judgment and cross-moved for summary judgment against American Bank.
R VoL 8, pp. 1803-37. In Wadsworth's cross-motion, Wadsworth argued for the first time that

5
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American Bank waived its priority defense to Wadsworth's claim oflien by posting the Lien
Release Bond. Id., pp. 1828-29.
8.

On February 2,2011, the district court denied American Bank's motion

for summary judgment on the priority issue and granted Wadsworth's cross-motion for summary
judgment, concluding as a matter oflaw "that by American Bank posting the lien release bond
and this Court entering its order releasing of record in its entirety and for all purposes
Wadsworth's mechanic's lien, the issue oflien priority is not relevant." R Vol. 11, p. 2742.
Then, after finding that American Bank waived its priority defense by posting the Lien Release
Bond, the district court ordered the parties to trial for all remaining factual disputes, but only for
those issues relating to the validity and amount of Wadsworth's claim oflien. Id., p. 2743.
9.

On February 16,2011, American Bank filed a motion for reconsideration

ofthe district court's February 2,2011, order that mooted the issue oflien priority. R Vol. 11,
pp.2746-67.
10.

On April 13,2011, the district court denied American Bank's motion for

reconsideration, reflecting at oral argument on such motion that:
So to me there is a distinction between simply the cash bond that
certainly will assure that someone will get paid and the leverage
that, I guess, is attenuated to the real estate that, in fact, would
secure the indebtedness.
That seems, while it's not directly discussed in a lot of these cases,
seems to be one of the overall principles of the materialman's lien
that goes to the very nature of the effectiveness of those liens in
our business and legal system.

6
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So that's just the overall concept that I've struggled with and
looked at in terms of drawing that distinction between just the
bond sitting there and the lien on the real property.

See Tr. at 119:8-23.
11.

On May 2 and 3, 2011, the district court held a two day bench trial on

issues regarding the validity and amount of Wadsworth's claim oflien. See Tr. at 143:1 - 376:5.
12.

On August 22,2011, the district court issued its findings of fact and

conclusions oflaw regarding the validity and amount of Wadsworth's claim oflien, ultimately
concluding that Wadsworth's lien was valid and allowing Wadsworth to collect the principal
amount of$I,845,697.78 from the Lien Release Bond posted by American Bank. R Vol. 13,
pp.3207-46. In such memorandum, the district court found:
•

that "Wadsworth was not exempt from registering under the Contractor
[Registration] Act." (Id., p. 3222.);

•

that "Wadsworth was not registered 'at all times during the period that it
furnished work or labor or supplied materials in constructing [the golf
course]' as required by Idaho Code Section 54-5217(2) .... " (Id., p. 3225
(emphasis in original.);

•

that "Wadsworth engaged in unlawful activity by failing to obtain
'satisfactory proof of Precision's, Colorado Lining's, and Concrete
Finishing's [Wadsworth's subcontractors] registration under the
[Contractor Registration] Act." (Id., p. 3229.);

•

that "under Idaho's mechanic lien statutes and mortgage foreclosure
statute, American Bank has standing to enforce the terms of the
Wadsworth Contract [with BRN] including the Golden Releases [lien
waivers required by Wadsworth's contract with BRN]." (Id., p. 3237.);

•

that pursuant to the language contained in the Golden Releases:
"Wadsworth agreed to subordinate its lien priority date to other third
party liens that attached to the property prior to the date inserted in
the Golden Release"; that "the Golden Release by its express terms

7
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included such subordination and waiver terms for the express benefit of
'any liens or encumbrances attaching to the subject property prior to said
date,' including American Bank's mortgage lien"; and that "under
Idaho's mechanic lien statutes and mortgage foreclosure statute, American
Bank has standing to enforce the terms of the Wadsworth Contract
including the Golden Releases", or "[a]lternatively, American Bank
qualifies as a third party beneficiary of Wadsworth's contract with BRN
DeVelopment." (Id., pp. 3236-37 (emphasis added).);
•

that "Wadsworth may have judgment for said sums [$1,845,697.78] as
against the bond posted in this matter by American Bank (see February 2,
2011, Memorandum Decision and Order)." (Id., p. 3243, , 4.).

13.

On October 6,2011, the district court awarded Wadsworth prejudgment

interest, attorney fees, and costs and entered a judgment in favor of Wadsworth for the principal
sum of$1,845,697.78, prejudgment interest in the amount of$371,368.82, attorney fees and
costs in the amount of$208,417.47, for a total judgment of $2,425,484.07, with the total
judgment accruing postjudgment interest at the statutory rate of 5.25%. R. Vol. 13, pp. 3331-52.
Further, the judgment states: "Wadsworth Golf Construction Company of the Southwest shall
have said sums in this Judgment as against the bond posted in this matter by American Bank
given Bond No. 0525542." Id., p. 3352, , 1. Finally, the district court certified the judgment as
final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id., p. 3352.
14.

On November 14, 2011, American Bank filed a notice of appeal ofthe

district court's Rule 54(b) judgment and the underlying orders supporting such judgment.
R Vol. 13,pp. 3368-79. 3

Wadsworth has agreed to stay execution on the Lien Release Bond during the pendency
ofthis appeal and in exchange American Bank has agreed to keep the Lien Release Bond in
effect during the pendency of this appeal.
3

8
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B.

Proceedings Relating to the Foreclosure of American Bank's Mortgage.
15.

On July 21,2010, American Bank moved for summary judgment

regarding the amount that BRN owed to American Bank and seeking an order to judicially
foreclose its mortgage against all other parties claiming an interest in the Property, which
remaining parties were not contesting the priority of American Bank's Mortgage. R Vol. 8,
pp. 1703-34.
16.

By February 24,2011, no party had filed an opposition to American

Bank's motion for summary judgment regarding either the amount that BRN owed to American
Bank or the foreclosure of American Bank's mortgage. As a result, on February 24,2011, the
district court entered an order establishing the amount that BRN owed to American Bank and
decreeing that the Property be offered for sale for purposes of recovering the sums owed to
American Bank and foreclosing out all junior interests in the Property. R Vol. 11, pp. 27892809.
17.

On February 24,2011, the district court entered a Judgment and Decree of

Foreclosure of American Bank's Mortgage ("Foreclosure Decree"). R Vol. 11, pp. 2810-28. In
such Foreclosure Decree, the district court ordered the Property to be sold by sheriffs sale, with
the proceeds from such sale to first cover the expenses of the sale, then to pay the receiver's fees,
then to pay the balance BRN owed to American Bank, with any remaining proceeds to "be
deposited with the court for payment to the junior creditors in order of their priority as adjudged
by this court pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-512 and 45-1302." Id., p. 2814, ~ 5. The same

9
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Foreclosure Decree states: "American Bank has the right to credit bid and purchase at the
Sheriffs Sale." Id.,
18.

~

6.
On May 19,2011, the Property was sold at a foreclosure sale. See

Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, R Vol. 13, p. 3153. At the sale, American Bank made a credit bid
for the Property in the amount of$18,682,767.78, the amount owing for the costs of sale,
sheriffs fees, receiver's fees, and the balance BRN owed to American Bank. Id. Because no
one beat American Bank's credit bid, the Property was sold to American Bank, and there were
no surplus proceeds to pay junior lienholders. Id. at pp. 3153-54.
III.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The underlying action relates to multiple parties involved in the design,

construction and financing of a golf course and residential project in Kootenai County, Idaho,
commonly referred to as the Black Rock North Project ("Project"). BRN was the owner of the
subject real property and the Project developer. The Project consisted of approximately one
thousand (1,000) acres. The golf course traverses through the Project and consists of
approximately two hundred (200) acres of the one thousand (1,000) acre parcel. See R Vol. 12,
pp. 3005-06, ~ 1; R Vol. 13, p. 3211, ~ 1.
2.

On October 10,2006, BRN entered into a letter of illtent with Wadsworth,

whereby Wadsworth was selected as the de facto general contractor for the golf course. Between
October 2006 and January 2007, BRN and Wadsworth negotiated the terms of a written contract
culminating in execution of a final contract on or about January 27, 2007 (hereinafter the final
contract between Wadsworth and BRN shall be referred to as the "Wadsworth Contract"). The

10
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Wadsworth Contract required Wadsworth to perfonn certain obligations in exchange for
payments from BRN. R Vol. 12, pp. 3006-07, ~ 4; R Vol. 13, p. 3212, ~ 4.
'3.

Wadsworth commenced work in October of2006, and continued through

December of2006. The work perfonned in that initial period included shaping of two of the
proposed eighteen holes. R Vol. 12, p. 3007, ~ 5; R Vol. 13, p. 3212, ~ 5.
4.

Wadsworth did not obtain a contractor registration license from the Idaho

Bureau of Occupational Licenses until January 9,2007, after it commenced work on the Project.
R Vol. 12, p. 3007, ~ 6; R Vol. 13, p. 3213, ~ 6.
5.

On February 2,2007, BRN and American Bank executed loan documents

whereby American Bank agreed to lend $15 million on a revolving line of credit to BRN for use
in constructing the golf course and surrounding residential community. The loan documents
consist of a Revolving Credit Agreement ("Credit Agreement"), a Revolving Credit Note
("Note") and a Mortgage, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing ("Mortgage") (hereinafter the
Credit Agreement, Note and Mortgage shall be collectively referred to as the "Loan
Documents"). American Bank recorded its Mortgage with the Kootenai County Recorder's
Office on February 6,2007. R Vol. 12, p. 3007, ~ 7; R Vol. 13, p. 3213, ~ 7.
6.

The Loan Documents granted American Bank a first priority mortgage

lien against the Property. Further, the Loan Documents required BRN to submit loan requests on
a form prescribed by American Bank ("Loan Requests"). In those Loan Requests, BRN certified
to American Bank that lien waivers had been obtained from any person who delivered labor,
services, material or equipment to the Property prior to the date of the Loan Requests. Over the
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period March 9, 2007, up through September 9,2007, BRN submitted seven (7) Loan Requests
to American Bank, wherein BRN certified to American Bank in each of those seven Loan
Requests that BRN had obtained lien waivers from any person who supplied labor, services,
material or equipment to the Property prior to the date of the Loan Requests. R Vol. 12,
pp. 3007-08, ~ 8; R Vol. 13, pp. 3213-14, ~ 8.
7.

Wadsworth submitted twenty-five (25) payment applications to BRN for

Wadsworth's work on the Project, which labor, services and material Wadsworth provided to the
Project up through November 21,2008. BRN did not submit any payments to Wadsworth until
Wadsworth submitted a lien waiver to BRN. On certain occasions, Wadsworth submitted a
release on a form that was attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference into the
Wadsworth Contract ("Golden Lien Release"). On other occasions, Wadsworth submitted its
own lien waiver that it had used on other construction projects ("Arizona Release"). R Vol. 12,
pp. 3008-09, ~ 9; R Vol. 13, p. 3214, ~ 9.
8.

The Golden Lien Releases that Wadsworth executed and submitted to

BRN and the Golden Lien Release form incorporated by reference into the Wadsworth Contract
all state:
Upon receipt of payment of the sum of $
, the
undersigned waives any and all right to any lien whatever and
releases all rights to lien or claim any lien against the real property
associated with the above Project by the undersigned in connection
with any and all work or labor performed, materials, equipment,
goods, or things supplied or furnished, or any other claims or
obligations owed through the date shown above, on the abovenamed Project.

12

Client:2396663.1

*

*

*

In addition, upon receipt of the payment stated above, the
undersigned agrees that any lien that may be filed for work
performed after said date will only have lien priority from and after
the date stated above and will be subordinate to any liens or
encumbrances attaching to the subject property prior to said date.
See Trial Exs. 1, and 29-34. Wadsworth submitted six (6) Golden Lien Releases to BRN. For
each of the six Golden Lien Releases that Wadsworth submitted to BRN, BRN paid Wadsworth
the dollar sum that is referenced in each of those six Golden Lien Releases. The date of the last
Golden Lien Release is March 19,2008. R Vol. 12, p. 3009,,10; R Vol. 13, p. 3214,,11.
9.

Wadsworth subcontracted out a portion of the work that it was obligated to

perform as per the Wadsworth Contract. On October 15,2006, Wadsworth and Precision
Irrigation, Inc. ("Precision") entered into a written subcontract agreement (the "Precision
Agreement"). The Precision Agreement obligated Precision to construct an irrigation system for
the golf course. Precision billed Wadsworth for over $2 million worth of work on the Project.
Precision never obtained a contractor registration license with the Idaho Bureau of Occupational
Licenses at any time. R Vol. 12, pp. 3010-11, , 17; R Vol. 13, p. 3217, , 18.
10.

Wadsworth entered into a subcontract agreement with Concrete Finishing,

Inc. ("Concrete Finishing") to install concrete golf cart paths (the "Concrete Finishing
Agreement"). Concrete Finishing obtained its contractor registration license from the Idaho
Bureau of Occupational Licenses on September 11, 2007, 15 days after it began work on the
Project. R Vol. 12, p. 3011, ,18; R Vol. 13, p. 3217, '19.
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11.

Wadsworth also contracted with Colorado Lining Construction, Inc.

("Colorado Lining"), which never obtained a contractor registration license. Tr. at 297:9298:6; R Vol. 13, p. 3217, ~ 19.
IV.

1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

Did the district court err by refusing to consider the priority of American

Bank's Mortgage over Wadsworth's claim oflien and thereby allowing Wadsworth to recover
$2.4 million from the Lien Release Bond when Wadsworth would have recovered nothing by
foreclosing its claim of lien against the Property?
2.

Given that Wadsworth breached the ICRA by failing to register under the

Act at all times it performed work on the Project, did the district court err by allowing
Wadsworth to recover on its claim oflien?
3.

Given that Wadsworth breached the ICRA by engaging subcontractors

who failed to register under the Act, did the district court err by allowing Wadsworth to recover
on its claim oflien?
4.

Did the district court err in awarding Wadsworth prejudgment interest,

costs and attorney fees?
V.

STANDARDOFREVIEW

American Bank does not contest any ofthe factual findings ofthe district court.
Rather, American Bank contests certain legal conclusions ofthe district court, including the
district court's interpretation ofthe Lien Bond Statute and the ICRA. As such, this Court
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exercises de novo review of the issues raised on appeal by American Bank. Stonebrook Constr.,
LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 277 P.3d 374 (Idaho 2012).

This Court reviews appeals from an order of summary judgment de
novo, and the "standard of review is the same as the standard used
by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." ...
Where "the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact,
then only a question of law remains, over which this Court
exercises free review." This Court exercises "free review over
interpreting a statute's meaning and applying the facts to the law."
Id. at 376 (quoting Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458,

461 (2008), Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d
641,644 (2006), and VFP VCv. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 331,109 P.3d 714,719 (2005».
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred by Refusing to Consider the Priority of American
Bank's Mortgage Over Wadsworth's Claim of Lien, Thereby Allowing
Wadsworth to Collect Over $2.4 Million From the Lien Bond When
Wadsworth Would Have Recovered Nothing by Foreclosing Its Claim of
Lien Against the Property.
The district court allowed Wadsworth to recover $2.4 million from the Lien

Release Bond posted by American Bank even though Wadsworth would have recovered nothing
by foreclosing its claim oflien against the Property. See Course of Proceedings ("COP") at
"12-13 and 15-18. More specifically, when granting Wadsworth's motion for partial summary
judgment, the district court held "that by American Bank posting the lien release bond and this
Court entering its order releasing of record in its entirety and for all purposes Wadsworth's
mechanic's lien, the issue oflien priority is not relevant." R Vol. 11, p. 2742. In so holding, the
district court stated that nothing in Idaho's Lien Bond Statute preserved American Bank's right

15

Client:2396663.1

to assert the priority of its Mortgage over Wadsworth's claim of lien once Wadsworth's lien was
removed from the Property. R. Vol. 11, p. 2740.
The legal effect of the district court's ruling was that American Bank waived its
priority defense by posting the lien bond. The practical effect of the district court's ruling was
that American Bank gratuitously made itselfliable for the $2,425,483.50 judgment entered in
favor of Wadsworth because, had American Bank never posted the lien bond, Wadsworth's
claim oflien would have been foreclosed out by American Bank's Mortgage and thereby
rendered worthless. See COP at ~~ 15-18.
The question presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred in holding
American Bank and the bond surety liable for a mechanic's lien that would have been foreclosed
out by American Bank's Mortgage had Wadsworth's claim oflien remained attached to the
Property.
1.

The district court erred by failing to give effect to all parts of Idaho's
Lien Bond Statute.

Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. Hayden

Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005). If the statutory
language is unambiguous, this Court need not engage in statutory construction and should apply
the statute's plain meaning. Id. In other words, "[a]n unambiguous statute must be given its
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning." Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 15,232
P.3d 330,336 (2010). Further, when interpreting an unambiguous act, this Court must give
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effect to the "whole act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the
provisions." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 199 P.3d 123, 150 (2008).
The district court's interpretation of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute is that by posting
the lien bond, American Bank could only contest the validity and amount of Wadsworth's claim
oflien, but not lien priority. R Vol. 11, pp. 2741-42 ("The judgment referred to in I.C. § 45523(2), is a product ofI.C. § 45-522, of which this Court has determined only validity and the
amount found due are relevant issues, not lien priority."). But in doing so, the district court erred
by not considering other provisions ofIdaho's Lien Bond Statute that limit Wadsworth's
recovery to the amount that Wadsworth's lien had been secured by the Property.

a.

Idaho's Lien Bond Statute limits Wadsworth's recovery to the
amount determined "to have been secured by his lien," a past
tense phrase that limits Wadsworth's recovery to the amount
Wadsworth would have recovered by foreclosing its lien
against the Property.

When interpreting Idaho's Lien Bond Statute the district court held that "there is
no mention in I.e. § 45-518, et seq. of any determination oflien priority." R. Vol. 11, p. 2740.
In so ruling, the district court focused on Idaho Code Section 45-522. Id. (" ... I.C. § 45-522
provides that Wadsworth's rights include and this Court may award to Wadsworth the amount
found due to Wadsworth, including costs and fees."). But the district court failed to consider
other language in Idaho's Lien Bond Statute that limits Wadsworth's recovery, and American
Bank's liability, to "such amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may adjudge to have been
secured by his lien, with interest costs and attorney's fees." See IDAHO CODE § 45-519. By
failing to give effect to Section 45-519, the district court failed to follow Idaho's long-standing
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rules of statutory construction that required the district court to give effect to all parts of Idaho's
Lien Bond Statute. Univ. a/Utah Hasp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 245, 248, 611 P.2d
1030,1033 (1980) ("[t]his Court is required to give effect to [e]very word, clause and sentence
of [the] statute, where possible .... "); State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334, 338, 317 P.2d 341,344
(1957) ("... all parts of the statute must be given effect ifit can be done.").
Construing Idaho Code Section 45-522 consistently with the other qualifying
language ofIdaho Code Section 45-519, and applying the plain meaning of the past tense phrase
"to have been secured by his lien" found in 45-519, the district court's error becomes clear. The
past tense phrase "to have been secured" refers to Wadsworth's prior security interest in the
Property, as opposed to Wadsworth's present security interest in the lien bond. And in this case,
Wadsworth had no security in the Property because there was not sufficient equity in the
Property to pay any lien creditors that fell behind American Bank's Mortgage. See Course of
Proceeding, supra ("COP") at ~~ 15-18. Thus, because Wadsworth had no security in the
Property and would have recovered nothing by foreclosing its lien against the Property,
Wadsworth should not recover anything from the lien bond that was intended to put Wadsworth
in the same position it would have been by foreclosing its lien against the Property. At best for
Wadsworth, the matter should be remanded to give Wadsworth an opportunity to prove that there
was sufficient equity in the Property to pay Wadsworth's claim oflien, after giving consideration
to the priority of American Bank's Mortgage.
As noted by the district court, "the issue raised [lien priority in an action to
recover against a lien bond] is one offrrst impression [in Idaho]" and "I.e. §§ 45-518 through
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45-524 have not previously been interpreted." R Vol. 12, p. 2928. However, numerous cases
outside ofIdaho support American Bank's argument that Wadsworth's recovery from the lien
bond should be limited to the same amount it would have recovered by foreclosing its lien
against the Property.
. . . [T]he bonding off statute merely releases the real estate from
the mechanic's lien claim by requiring that payment of the bond be
"conditioned for the payment of such judgment adjudicating the
lien or liens to be valid and determining the amount for which the
same would have been enforceable against the real estate."

YorkFed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hazel, 256 Va. 598, 602, 506 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1998) (quoting
VA. CODE § 43-70).
The General Assembly accomplished that purpose by authorizing
the courts to permit any party who could be adversely affected by
the enforcement of a mechanic's lien, i.e. "the owner of the
property affected thereby, the general contractor or other parties in
interest," to file a bond securing payment of whatever claim
otherwise could be enforced by judicial sale of the property.

George W Kane, Inc. v. Nuscope, Inc., 243 Va. 503, 508-09,416 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1992)
(quoting VA. CODE § 43-71).
The purpose of Section 49-37 is carried out when the lien can be
attacked both to declare it entirely invalid or to declare it invalid
only as to a party who is adversely affected by it. Consequently,
United Bank had the power under Section 49-37, ifit filed a bond,
to assert the priority of its mortgage over the PDS lien.

PDS Eng'g & Constr., Inc. v. Double RS, 42 Conn. Supp. 460, 465, 627 A.2d 959, 963 (1992).
Because recovery on the bond is part ofthe process for enforcing
the mechanic's lien, authorities from other jurisdictions have
concluded that a cause of action to foreclose a mechanic's lien is
substantially the same whether relief is sought against the liened
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property or against the bond which has been substituted for the
property.

Hutnick v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 47 Cal. 3d 456, 463, 763 P .2d 1326, 1330, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 236 (Cal. 1988).
[E]ven though a claimant proves the lien is enforceable, its
recovery may be limited because of prior existing mortgages
and/or lien claimants competing for the same money. . .. Again,
the bond only replaces the property that was subject to the lien, and
the recovery against the bond should be the same as the recovery
against the property.
Kevin J. Russell, Mechanics Lien Discharge Bonds, FOR THE DEFENSE, 46 No.9 DRIFTD 58
(Sept. 2004); accord May Constr. Co. v. Town Creek Constr. & Dev., LLC, _ _ S.W.3d_,
2011 Ark. 281,2011 WL 2477185, *4-5 (2011) (affirming district court's consideration of
priority when assessing a mechanic's lien claimant's ability to collect from a lien bond, but
reversing and remanding with instructions to apply proper legal standard for determining
priority).

In sum, the plain meaning ofthe phrase "to have been secured by his lien" found
in Idaho Code Section 45-519 refers to the amount that Wadsworth's lien was secured by the
Property, thus limiting Wadsworth's recovery to the amount that it would have recovered by
foreclosing its lien against the Property. To hold otherwise, as the district court did, is
inconsistent with Idaho's rules of statutory interpretation because it ignores the language of
Idaho Code Section 45-519.
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b.

Wadsworth's interpretation ofthe phrase "to have been
secured by his lien" is unreasonable, leads to an absurd and
unreasonably harsh result, and defeats the purpose of Idaho's
Lien Bond Statute.

Wadsworth argues that the phrase "to have been secured by his lien" only requires
Wadsworth to prove that its lien attached to the Property and not that Wadsworth's lien was
"secured" in the sense that there was sufficient equity in the Property to pay Wadsworth's claim
oflien after satisfying all senior lien claimants. See Tr. at 130: 12 - 131: 18.
The mere fact that Wadsworth offers up its own interpretation of Idaho's Lien
Bond Statute does not make the statute ambiguous. Stonebrook Constr., 277 P.3d at 378
(" ... ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing interpretations to
the court."). Rather, Wadsworth must offer an alternative reasonable interpretation. State v.

Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). In determining whether Wadsworth's
alternative interpretation is reasonable, this Court should consider the public policy behind the
statute, its legislative history, the context in which the language is used, the evils to be remedied,
and the objects in view. Id., Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist., 141 Idaho at 312, 109 P.3d at 166.
Additionally, this Court has stated that statutory "interpretations that could lead to absurd or
unreasonably harsh results are disfavored." Id.
In this action, nobody disputes that Idaho's Lien Bond Statute allowed American
Bank to bond around Wadsworth's claim oflien. R Vol. 11, p. 2740 (" ... American Bank, as a
'party in interest in the premises subject to the lien' obtained a surety bond executed by
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American Bank, and therefore complied with the requirements ofLC. § 45-519."). Rather, the
parties dispute the legal effect of American Bank bonding around Wadsworth's junior lien.
As asserted in the previous section, American Bank argues that the Lien Release
Bond simply replaced the Property as the collateral securing Wadsworth's lien, entitling
Wadsworth to recover from the Lien Release Bond every penny it would have recovered by
foreclosing its lien against the Property. American Bank's interpretation is consistent with the
legislative history of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute and the Idaho title industry's customs and
practices. Minutes, House State Affairs Committee, Feb. 16, 1993 (HB 305)4 ("It allows
someone who is grieved by a lien to post a bond and bond around the lien" and "the lien creditor
is adequately protected by putting the bond as security instead of a lien on the [property].");
Affidavit of Jeffrey Bo Davies ("Davies Aff."), R Vol. 11, pp. 2784-87, ~~ 5-8 ("In the case of a
bond to release a mechanic's lien, it was commonly understood in Idaho's title industry that the
bonding company was only obligating itselfto pay that amount that the lien claimant could
recover through a foreclosure of its lien against the property. Thus, the bond was simply
replacing the property as the security for the mechanic's lien, but reserving all defenses to attack
the lien, including a defense that there is not sufficient equity in the property to pay a
subordinated lien.").
American Bank's interpretation of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute comports with
common sense as it allows the affected parties to preserve their legal rights, while at the same
The published legislative history ofIdaho's Lien Bond Statute is attached to this Brief
as Addendum C.
4
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time expediting the process of obtaining marketable title and preventing waste to the property
during the pendency ofthe litigation between the competing lien claimants. Hutnick, 47 Cal. 3d
at 462, 763 P.2d at 1330 ("The purpose of the release bond procedure is to provide a means by
which, before a final determination of the lien claimant's rights and without prejudice to those
rights, the property may be freed ofthe lien, so that it may be sold, developed, or used as security
for the loan.").
The wisdom of the legislative purpose is readily apparent. A
mechanic's lien on a building in the course of construction, unless
promptly removed, can entail loss of credit, work stoppage, and
financial collapse. The time element may make imperative the use
of the deposit method of discharge to avert disaster. The remedy
of deposit, therefore, may quite properly be used as a stopgap
pending the employment of a more leisurely remedy under any of
the appropriate provisions of Section 19.
Application ofTumac Realty Corp., 203 Misc. 649,652, 123 N.Y.S.2d 642,645 (1952).

Wadsworth argues that Idaho's Lien Bond Statute made American Bank and the
bond surety a guarantor of Wadsworth's claim of lien, regardless of whether Wadsworth would
have recovered anything had Wadsworth's lien remained attached to the Property. The district
court accepted Wadsworth's interpretation largely based upon the district court's ipse dixit
conclusion that Wadsworth's claim oflien against the Property was more valuable than the
security provided by the Lien Release Bond. See COP at 1 10.
Wadsworth's and the district court's interpretation of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute is
inconsistent with Idaho's rules of statutory construction. First, the district court's conclusion that
a lien against real estate is more valuable than the security provided by a lien bond is contrary to
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the Idaho Lien Bond Statute legislative history. See Minutes, House State Affairs Committee,
Feb. 16, 1993 (HB 305) ("the lien creditor is adequately protected by putting the bond as security
instead of a lien on the [property]."). Second, accepting this alternative interpretation leads to an
absurd and unreasonably harsh result because it makes American Bank liable for a mechanic's
lien that would have been foreclosed out by American Bank's Mortgage had it remained attached
to the Property. See COP at ~~ 15-18.
Giving Wadsworth a $2.4 million windfall recovery and imposing a
corresponding liability upon American Bank simply because American Bank posted the Lien
Release Bond is also inconsistent with numerous reported decisions interpreting similar lien
bond statutes. These decisions uniformly hold that a lien claimant should not be given additional
rights simply because a lien bond is substituted as the collateral for the property. Camputaro v.
Stuart Hardwood Corp., 180 Conn. 545,549,429 A.2d 796, 798 (1980) ("Obviously, the

plaintiff's rights on the bond can rise no higher than those acquired under the underlying
mechanic's lien for which the bond is merely a substitute."); North v. WajJle House, Inc., 177
Ga. App. 162, 163,338 S.E.2d 750, 752 (1985) ("The lien release bond ... serves as a
replacement for the lien to which it refers, and does not authorize a new and different procedure
limited to the bond or result in additional rights."); Royster Constr. Co. v. Urban W Cmty., 40
Cal. App. 4th 1158, 1166,47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684, 688-89 (1995) (quoting Ohio Plate Glass Co. v.
Paskin,4 Ohio Misc. 136,209 N.E.2d 640, 642 (1965)) (" ... an action against a release bond

surety 'does not change the cause of action [to foreclose the mechanic's lien] in any way' .").
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In no uncertain terms, if the district court's interpretation stands, the provisions of

Idaho's Lien Bond Statute that allow one lienholder to bond around another lienholder will
become meaningless as no senior lienholder will ever bond around a junior lienholder ifby doing
so it waives its priority defense. Six Carpenters, Inc. v. Beach Carpenters Corp., 172 Conn. 1, 7,
372 A.2d 123, 127 (1976) ("The construction urged by the defendant would discourage the
substitution of bonds by agreement because of fear of waiving defenses to the underlying lien.");
Davies Aff., R Vol. 11, pp. 2786-87, , 8 ("In sum, the Court's order mooting the priority issue
because of the posting of the lien bond will disrupt a long standing practice in the Idaho real
estate industry, wherein senior lienholders often use Idaho's Lien Bond Statute as a mechanism
for bonding around a junior lienholder and thereby preserving the maximum value of the real
estate collateralizing the senior lien, while at the same time preserving the junior lienholder's
security by providing an adequate alternative source of collateral should there be sufficient
equity in the property to satisfy both the senior lienholder and the junior lienholder.").
In sum, even ifIdaho's Lien Bond Statute is ambiguous, American Bank offers a

more reasonable interpretation: namely, Wadsworth should be entitled to recover the same
amount from the lien bond that it would have recovered by foreclosing its lien against the
Property, resulting in no prejudice to Wadsworth and allowing American Bank to mitigate its
losses by expediting the marketability ofthe collateral securing its loan to BRN.
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2.

Any order releasing a mechanic's lien upon the posting of a lien bond
does not remove the lien for all purposes, but rather the bond replaces
the property as the collateral securing the mechanic's lien.

The district court's February 2,2011, order mooting the lien priority issue was
primarily based upon the district court's erroneous belief that its prior April 27, 2010, order,
which order was entered upon stipulation of American Bank and Wadsworth, released
Wadsworth's lien "in its entirety and for all purposes" and as a result "[i]t is difficult to
prioritize a lien that no longer exists of record." R Vol. 11, p. 2740 (emphasis in original). By
concluding that its order entered on April 27, 2010, released Wadsworth's mechanic's lien for all
purposes, the district court again failed to give effect to the entirety of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute.
Upon the posting of American Bank's lien bond and proof of payment ofthe
premium, Idaho's Lien Bond Statute required the district court to enter an order that recited "that
the lien is released of record for all purposes to the same extent as if released of record by the
lienor." See IDAHO CODE § 45-521(2). Further, Idaho's Lien Bond Statute recites that "[u]pon
entry of the order, the lien is released of record in its entirety and for all purposes and the real
property, the subject ofthe lien, is released from the encumbrances of the lien." See IDAHO
CODE § 45-512(3).
But other provisions ofIdaho's Lien Bond Statute reflect that the lien is not
released for all purposes, but rather just released against the property and then attached to the
lien bond as an adequate alternative form of security. See IDAHO CODE §§ 45-519 and
45-522(1). The stipulated order entered by the Court on April 27, 2010, recites likewise, "the
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bond filed herein shall be subject to the claims that would otherwise constitute liens against the
above-described property." See COP at,-r 5.
Additionally, the legislative history for Idaho's Lien Bond Statute provides that
the lien is not released for all purposes but rather simply changes the collateral to which the lien
attaches. See Minutes, House State Affairs Committee, Feb. 16, 1993 (HB 305) ("the lien
creditor is adequately protected by putting the bond as security instead of a lien on the
[property]. ").
Again, no Idaho appellate court has interpreted Idaho's Lien Bond Statute.
However, numerous other jurisdictions have concluded that a lien bond simply replaces the
property as the collateral securing the mechanic's lien and, as such, does not extinguish the
mechanic's lien for all purposes as the district court erroneously concluded in this matter.
DBM also argues that it would have been impossible to foreclose
on the lien once the bond had released it from the property because
there was no longer any lien to foreclose upon, but his argument is
simply incorrect A lien bond does not eliminate a lien entirely. A
lien bond releases the property from the lien, but the lien is then
secured by the bond.

DBM Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Wash. App. 35, 41-42,170
P.3d 592, 596 (2007).
The surety bond will not extinguish API's lien or affect its priority.
It will only substitute the bond for the land as the object to which
the lien attaches.

TO. IXv. Super. Ct. a/Ventura County, 165 Cal. App. 4th 140, 148,80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602, 608
(2008).
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The release bond procedure thus protects the lien claimant by
providing an alternate source of recovery on the claim of lien. The
release bond procedure "does not deprive the [lien claimant] of its
constitutional right to a lien" but "[o]n the contrary, it provides for
the speedy and efficient enforcement of such lien.... "
Hutnick, 47 Cal. 3d at 463, 763 P.2d at 1330 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
If a lien release bond is properly obtained and recorded under
OCGA Section 44-14-264, "the bond stands in the place of the real
property as security for the lien claimant."
Cent. Atlanta Tractor Sales, Inc. v. Athena Dev., LLC, 289 Ga. App. 355, 356, 657 S.E.2d 290,
292 (2008) (citation omitted).
Obviously, the plaintiff's rights on the bond can rise no higher than
those acquired under the underlying mechanic's lien for which the
bond is merely a substitute.
Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corp., 180 Conn. 545,549,429 A.2d 796, 798 (1980).
Once Kane posted the bond, NuScope's security for the claim
underlying its mechanic's lien became the bond ... and not the
real estate.
Kane, 243 Va. at 509,416 S.E.2d at 705.

3.

The district court erroneously concluded that Virginia's lien bond
statute is distinguishable from Idaho's Lien Bond Statute.

York Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Hazel, Inc., 256 Va. 598, 506 S.E.2d 315
(1998), is procedurally and factually nearly identical to the matter at hand. In York, a lender
bonded around a mechanic's lien after the contractor filed an action to foreclose its mechanic's
lien. After the lender and contractor stipulated to the validity and amount of the contractor's
lien, the contractor moved for summary judgment, therein seeking an order that allowed the
contractor to collect the stipulated amount from the lien bond. The lender contested the
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contractor's motion for summary judgment, arguing that Virginia's lien bond statute limited the
contractor's recovery to that amount it would have collected from the property. The district
court rejected the lender's argument and granted the contractor's motion for summary judgment,
ruling that the contractor could collect the stipulated amount from the lien bond without having
to prove that its mechanic's lien was prior to the lender's deed of trust.
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the matter
for factual findings regarding the amount the contractor would have recovered by foreclosing its
lien against the property after considering the priority between the contractor's claim oflien and
the lender's deed of trust. [d. at 602, 506 S.E.2d at 317.
In this action, the district court distinguished York on the basis that:

The two statutes that the York court analyzed and applied to the
facts of that case, Virginia Code §§ 43-21 and 43-70, are
sufficiently different than I.e. § 45-518, et seq. Notably absent
from the Virginia statutes is any mention of the lien being released
of record in its entirety and for all purposes.
R Vol. 11, pp. 2740-41. However, upon close comparison, Idaho's Lien Bond Statute and
Virginia's lien bond statute both limit a claimant's recovery on the lien bond to the amount they
would have recovered by foreclosing their mechanic's lien against the property.
More specifically, Virginia's lien bond statute recites that " ... [a] part[y] in
interest may ... apply to the court in which such suit shall be pending ... for permission to file a
bond in the penalty of double the amount of such lien ... and costs ... conditioned for the
payment of such judgment adjUdicating the lien ... to be valid and determining the amount for
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which the same would have been enforceable against the real estate as may be rendered by the
court upon the hearing of the case on its merits .... " See VA. CODE § 43-70.
Idaho's Lien Bond Statute similarly limits American Bank's and the bond surety's
liability to "such amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may adjudge to have been secured
by [Wadsworth's] lien, with interest, costs and attorney's fees." See IDAHO CODE § 45-519.
Simply put, there is no meaningful difference between the past tense phrase "the
amount for which the same would have been enforceable against the real estate as may be
rendered by the court" used in Virginia Code Section 43-70 and the past tense phrase "such
amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may adjudge to have been secured by his lien" as
used in Idaho Code Section 45-519. Both phrases refer to the prior security interest in the
property, and both limit recovery on the lien bond to the amount that the lien claimant would
have recovered by foreclosing its lien against the property.

4.

The legal citations adopted by the district court do not support the
district court's holding that the issue of lien priority was waived or
mooted as a result of American Bank posting the lien bond.

The district court did not cite any case that held a lien priority is waived or
mooted by the posting of a lien bond. Rather, the district court simply stated that
" ... Wadsworth provides that there is no Idaho case law on this matter and cites this Court to
numerous non-Idaho authority for the proposition that the only remaining issues remaining postbond are validity and the amount ofthe lien." R Vol. 11, pp. 2737-38. Then the district court
cited Corpus Juris Secundum for the proposition that "[t]he giving of a bond to discharge
property from a mechanic's lien is not an acknowledgement of the validity of the lien, and does
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not change the lien claimant's burden to prove he or she is entitled to payment under the
mechanic's lien law. In connection the owner [debtor, principal and/or surety] may still contest
the lien's existence, amount, and validity." !d., p. 2741 (quoting 56 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens

§ 299 (2010)). Additionally, the district court cited to a Washington Court of Appeals decision
for the proposition that "a lien bond in lieu of a mechanic's lien does not eliminate a lien
entirely; rather, a lien bond releases the property from the lien, but the lien is then secured by the
bond. Further, a judgment adjudicating the validity ofthe lien is required to foreclose on the
lien." !d. (citingDBM Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Wash.
App. 35, 170 P.3d 592 (2007)).
Neither the DBM Consulting decision nor the CJS citation support the district
court's ultimate holding that the issue oflien priority was mooted by American Bank: posting the
lien bond. Rather, those citations support American Bank's argument that the posting of the lien
bond did nothing other than to change the form ofthe collateral securing Wadsworth's lien, from
the Property to the lien bond, thus requiring Wadsworth to prove its lien foreclosure action in the
same manner as it would have done by foreclosing its lien against the Property. For example, in
DBM Consulting Engineers, Inc., the Washington Court of Appeals held that the contractor

could not collect from the lien bond until it obtained a judgment foreclosing its claim oflien.
DBM Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 142 Wash. App. 35,41-42, 170 P.3d 592, 596 (Ct. App. 2007).

While the applicable foreclosure process depends on whether the
lien is secured by property (which can then be sold) or by a bond,
in either situation, the lien must be foreclosed upon before the
lienholder is entitled to recover on the lien. Mountain Ranch
[Corp. v. Amalgam Enters., Inc.], 143 P.3d [1065,] 1068-69
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[(Colo. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 WL 2864900, 2006
Colo. LEXIS 834 (Colo. Oct. 10,2006)]. So in order to be entitled
to payment on the bond, DBM needed to foreclose its lien.
Because DBM did not obtain a judgment foreclosing its lien,
Travelers is not obligated to pay on the lien bond.
Id.

The Washington Court of Appeals' adoption of the holdings of Hutnick and
Mountain Ranch is also instructive because in both ofthose cases the California Supreme Court

and the Colorado Court of Appeals held respectively that "[b ]ecause recovery on the bond is part
of the process for enforcing the mechanic's lien, authorities from other jurisdictions have
concluded that a cause of action to foreclose a mechanic's lien is substantially the same whether
relief is sought against the liened property or against a bond which has been substituted for the
property." Hutnick, 47 Cal. 3d at 463, 763 P.2d at 1330, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40; Mountain
Ranch Corp. v. Amalgam Enters., Inc., 143 P.3d 1065, 1068 (Colo. App. 2005).

But in this action the district court concluded that Wadsworth's claim to foreclose
its mechanic's lien against the Lien Release Bond is not substantially the same as an action to
foreclose its mechanic's lien against the Property, as the district court concluded that the issue of
priority is relevant in the latter action but not the former. R Vol. 11, p. 2737 ("Wadsworth
argues that American Bank had two choices. It could have chosen to litigate lien priority in the
foreclosure action, or American Bank could have obtained a lien release bond thereby releasing
Wadsworth's lien on the Project. American Bank chose to undertake the lat[t]er option, which
makes lien priority no longer an issue between American Bank and Wadsworth.").
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The CJS citation likewise does not state that lien priority is mooted by the posting
of a lien bond. Rather, it simply attempts to summarize various cases addressing the legal
significance of the posting of a lien bond. And while the CJS citation notes that "it has also been
held that a mechanics' lien claimant whose lien has been discharged by a bond may ... bring an
action in equity against the debtor and the surety on the bond and obtain therein a judgment
establishing the validity and amount of the lien and a personal judgment against the judgment
debtor and the surety on the bond," it also noted that "[t]here is authority that a surety is not
liable to a subcontractor on the surety's mechanic's lien substitution bond where the
subcontractor has not pursued the in rem remedy of foreclosure on the bond for which the surety
agreed to act as surety.... " See 56 C.J.S. Mechanic's Liens § 304 (2010) (citing the Colorado
Court of Appeals decision in Mountain Ranch for the latter proposition).
In sum, even the legal authorities cited by the district court support American
Bank's argument that Wadsworth's recovery on the lien bond should be limited to the amount it
would have recovered by foreclosing its lien against the Property.

B.

Because Wadsworth Was Not Registered Under the ICRA at All Times It
Performed Work on the Project, the District Court Erred in Allowing
Wadsworth to Recover on Its Claim of Lien.
The ICRA states that "[n]o person engaged in the business or acting in the

capacity of a contractor, unless otherwise exempt, may bring or maintain any action in any court
of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for
which registration is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly
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registered contractor, or that he was otherwise exempt as provided for in this chapter, at all times
during the performance of such act or contract." IDAHO CODE § 54-5217(2).
The district court determined that Wadsworth was not exempt from the ICRA and
that "Wadsworth was not registered 'at all times during the period that it furnished work or labor
or supplied materials in constructing [the golf course]' as required by Idaho Code

§ 54-5217(2) .... " R Vol. 13, p. 3225 (emphasis in original). Notwithstanding, the district
court still allowed Wadsworth to recover on its claim oflien. !d., p. 3227.
The question raised in this appeal is whether the district court erred by not
enforcing the plain language ofIdaho Code Section 54-5217(2), which bars a contractor from
bringing any action for unpaid compensation if it was not registered under the ICRA "at all times
during the performance of such act or contract." See IDAHO CODE § 54-5217(2). American
Bank asserts that the district court erred for the following reasons.
First, the district court erred by engaging in rules of statutory construction. The
district court did so in reliance of Judge Tingey's opinion in MWSH Idaho Falls, LLC v. Lupton,
Bonneville County Case No. CV-09-224, that the penalty provisions of the ICRA are ambiguous.
R Vol. 13, pp. 3225-27. Subsequent to the district court's ruling, this Court held in Stonebrook

Construction, LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, that the penalty provisions of the ICRA are
unambiguous.
When the Legislature enacted the ICRA, it took the extraordinary
step of expressly stripping the economic protections typically
extended to contractors. First, the Act's penalty section prohibits
unregistered contractors from bringing or maintaining "any action
in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for"
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any contracting work done. I.C. § 54-5217(2). Second, the Act
contains a separate provision expressly denying umegistered
contractors the right to place a lien. I.C. § 54-5208. The Act
contains no language limiting the circumstances under which these
penalties apply. In view of the unambiguous language specifying
the significant penalties imposed upon umegistered contractors, the
issue to be resolved is not whether Chase is entitled to invoke the
Act for its benefit, but whether Stonebrook complied with the
Act's registration requirements.
Stonebrook Constr., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 277 P.3d 374, 377-78 (Idaho 2012)

(emphasis added).
Because this Court has found the penalty provision of Section 54-5217(2) to be
unambiguous, the district court erred by applying the rules of statutory construction rather than
enforcing the penalty provisions ofldaho Code Section 54-5217(2) according to the plain, usual
and ordinary meaning of the words used in that statute. Stonebrook, 277 P.3d 374 at 378
(quoting Curlee v. Kootenai County. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 P.3d 458,465
(2008» ("Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction.").
More specifically, because the district court determined as a factual and legal
matter that "Wadsworth was not registered 'at all times during the period that it furnished work
or labor or supplied materials in constructing [the golf course]' as required by Idaho Code
§ 54-5217(2) ... ," (R Vol. 13, p. 3225 (emphasis in original», the district court should have
ended the analysis and dismissed Wadsworth's counterclaim, as the other language ofldaho
Code Section 54-5217(2) mandates that: "[n]o person ... may bring or maintain any action in
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any court in this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or
contract for which registration is required by this chapter .... "
Second, the district court erroneously relied upon this Court's decision in
ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010). The district court cited
ParkWest for the proposition that a contractor can recover for work performed during periods of

time the contractor was registered under the ICRA, even though it performed work on the same
project during other periods when it was not registered. R. Vol. 13, pp. 3224-25.
In Park West, this Court addressed whether a contractor's lien was invalidated

because of its failure to register at the time it entered into a contract to build a residential home.
Ultimately this Court determined that the critical question was not whether the contractor was
registered at the time it entered into the contract, but rather whether "ParkWest was registered
under the Contractor Act at all times during the period that it furnished work or labor or supplied
materials in constructing Bamson's house." ParkWest, 149 Idaho at 609,238 P.3d at 209.
Because "the uncontroverted evidence was that ParkWest was registered under the Contractor
Act at all times during the period that it furnished work or labor or supplied materials in
constructing Bamson's house," the Idaho Supreme Court held that ParkWest's lien was valid and
enforceable. Id.
Previously in the Park West decision, this Court stated that:
... ParkWest is entitled to a lien for work or labor it provided and
materials it supplied during the time that it was duly registered. To
hold otherwise would mean that a contractor who violated the Act
would be forever barred from obtaining a mechanic's lien.
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Id. at 608,238 P.3d at 208. These comments are dicta because there was no evidence that the

contractor in Park West was umegistered at any time that it furnished work or labor or supplied
materials in constructing the residential home. Rather, the "uncontroverted evidence" in
Park West established that the contractor "was registered under the Contractor Act at all times

during the period that it furnished work or labor or supplied materials in constructing Barnson's
house." Id. at 609, 238 P.2d at 209.
Because there was no finding in Park West that the contractor was umegistered at
times it furnished work or labor or supplied materials in constructing the residential home,
ParkWest is distinguishable from the matter at hand. Thus, the district court erred in relying on

dicta statements in Park West for the proposition that a contractor can recover for its work
performed during periods of time that it was registered under the ICRA, even though it was
umegistered during other periods of time that it performed work on the same project.
In sum, because the penalty provision of Section 54-5217(2) ofthe ICRA is

unambiguous, the district court erred by not enforcing the Act according to the plain meaning of
the words used in the statute. Applying the plain meaning of Section 54-5217(2), this Court
should reverse the district court with instructions on remand to dismiss Wadsworth's
counterclaim because of Wadsworth's failure to register under the ICRA "at all times during the
performance of such act or contract."
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C.

Alternatively, Because Wadsworth Violated the IeRA by Engaging
Unregistered Subcontractors, the District Court Erred in Allowing
Wadsworth to Recover on Its Claim of Lien.
Wadsworth used three subcontractors on the job that were not registered under the

ICRA. See Statement of Facts, ~~ 9-11. Two of the subcontractors, Precision and Colorado
Lining, never registered under the Act at any time they performed work on the Project. Id. at
~~

9 and 11. The third subcontractor, Concrete Finishing, performed work on the Project for 15

days before it registered under the Act. Id. at ~ 10. The district court concluded that Wadsworth
violated the ICRA by "failing to 'obtain satisfactory proof of Precision's, Colorado Lining's,
and Concrete Finishing's registration under the Act." R Vol. 13, p. 3229. Notwithstanding that
Wadsworth violated the Act, the district court did not invalidate Wadsworth's claim oflien in its
entirety, but rather "reduce[d] the lien by the amount of unpaid invoices owing to the
unregistered subcontractors." !d.
The question raised on appeal is whether the district court erred by allowing
Wadsworth to recover on its claim of lien even though it violated the ICRA by engaging
unregistered subcontractors. American Bank asserts that the district court erred by failing to
enforce the penalty provisions of the Act.

In the Ada County case of Prowall Drywall & Insulation, Inc. v. Plainridge, Ada
County Case No. CV-09-1225, District Judge Michael Wetherell addressed the same issue now
before this Court, i.e., what is the penalty for a general contractor's use of an unregistered
subcontractor. But unlike the district court's legal conclusion in this case, Judge Wetherell
interpreted the penalty provisions of the ICRA (Idaho Code Sections 54-5208 and 54-5217)
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consistent with the statement in Section 54-5204(2) that it is unlawful to engage unregistered
contractors. In so doing, Judge Wetherell invalidated the general contractor's lien in that case in
its entirety.
Whether Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to the hiring of
unregistered subcontractors is an issue of first impression.

*

*

*

As to the issue of whether Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to
registered contractors that engage unregistered subcontractors, this
Court finds that they do apply. The first sentence of Section 5208,
if read in a vacuum, would apparently operate to deny lien rights
only to unregistered contractors, and thus all registered contractors
would have lien rights. However, that interpretation would render
meaningless other parts of the statute. The most glaring is the first
clause of the second sentence in the statute, which states that the
statute will not operate to deny the rights of registered contractors
operating at the direction of unregistered contractors. If the first
sentence were to strictly apply only to unregistered contractors
themselves, that clause would be utterly without meaning, as it
only guarantees that lien rights will not be denied to a subset of
registered contractors, which would not have their rights denied
anyway.
The second part of Chapter 52 that would be rendered virtually
meaningless would be proscription of hiring unregistered
contractors. Section 5204 specifically makes it unlawful to engage
a subcontractor without receiving proof that the subcontractor was
registered. Ifthere were no penalties applied for violating that
provision, it would render "unlawful" virtually meaningless. This
Court must apply the law in such a way as to give effect to all
statutory provisions. If this Court were to decline to apply the
penalty provision to registered contractors who hire unregistered
contractors, it would render several provisions of this statute
meaningless. Thus, this Court finds that penalties of Sections 5208
and 5217 apply to registered contractors that engage unregistered
contractors.

*

*
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Since the penalties of Chapter 52 apply to registered contractors
that hire unregistered subcontractors, any lien claims arising while
the unregistered subcontractor is employed are conclusively
waived, and no action may be brought for collection of debts owed
on the labor. Since there is no disagreement that Rancho was
unregistered throughout all the work performed by Prowall on the
Plainridge Place Condominiums, Prowall's lien claims and action
to collect are barred.
See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment
Against Prowall Drywall & Insulation, Inc., dated Feb. 2, 2011, pp. 5-7, attached to this Brief as
AddendumD.
American Bank respectfully requests this Court to adopt the better-reasoned
analysis of Judge Wetherell in the Prowall case and hold that Wadsworth's use of unregistered
subcontractors violated the ICRA and as a consequence bars Wadsworth from bringing any
action to foreclose its claim of lien, or any other collection action for that matter, as it relates to
any unpaid work on the Project. For this separate alternative reason, this Court should remand
the matter back to the district court with instructions to dismiss Wadsworth's counterclaim.

D.

The District Court's Award oCPrejudgment Interest, Attorney Fees and
Costs Should Be Reversed.
The district court awarded Wadsworth prejudgment interest, costs and attorney

fees pursuant to various provisions of Idaho's mechanic's lien statute and Idaho's Lien Bond
Statute. R Vol. 13, pp. 3340-41 (citing IDAHO CODE §§ 45-513 and 45-522). More specifically,
the district court awarded prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees as an in rem award,
meaning the district court allowed Wadsworth to increase the amount of its lien by the award of
costs and attorney fees and collect the same from the Lien Release Bond posted by American
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Banle Id. (quoting Elec. Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 823-24, 41 P.3d 242,
251-52 (2001)).
For all of the arguments previously asserted, the district court erred by allowing
Wadsworth to collect prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees from the Lien Release Bond.
First, had Wadsworth foreclosed its claim oflien against the Property, Wadsworth's lien would
have been foreclosed out by American Bank's prior mortgage lien and Wadsworth would have
recovered none ofthe principal amount of its claim oflien, let alone any award of prejudgment
interest, costs or attorney fees.
Second, the district court should have invalidated Wadsworth's lien in its entirety
because of Wadsworth's failure to register under the ICRA or, alternatively, because of
Wadsworth's violation ofthe ICRA by engaging unregistered subcontractors.
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's order and
judgment that allows Wadsworth to collect prejudgment interest of$371,368.82 and costs and
attorney fees in the amount of$208,417.47 from the Lien Release Bond.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The district court erred by refusing to consider the priority of American Bank's
Mortgage over Wadsworth's claim of lien when determining the amount that Wadsworth could
collect from the Lien Release Bond. This matter should be remanded to the district court for a
factual determination ofthe amount that Wadsworth's claim oflien was secured by the Property,
after considering its subordination to American Bank's Mortgage, as that is the amount
Wadsworth should recover from the Lien Release Bond.
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Alternatively, because of Wadsworth's failure to maintain registration under the
ICRA at all times it worked on the Project, or because of Wadsworth's additional violation of the
ICRA by using unregistered subcontractors, this Court should invalidate Wadsworth's claim of
lien in its entirety and remand the matter back to the district court with instructions to dismiss
Wadsworth's counterclaim.
Finally, the district court's award of prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees
should be reversed because Wadsworth would not have recovered those sums had it foreclosed
its lien against the Property, or alternatively Wadsworth's lien is invalid in its entirety because of
Wadsworth's multiple violations of the ICRA.

+L

DATED this _10_ day of July, 2012.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By

&f'-

C. Clayton Gill- Of the Firm

Attorneys for American Bank
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I-l

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of July, 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy ofthe foregoing APPELLANT AMERICAN BANK'S OPENING BRIEF to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

(~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Edward J. Anson
WITHERSPOON, KELLEY, DAVENPORT
& TOOLE, P.S.
608 Northwest Blvd. #300
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2146
Facsimile (208) 667-8470

C. Clayton Gill
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Addendum A to American
Bank's Opening Brief

Idaho's Lien Bond Statute
Idaho Code Sections 45-518
through 45-524
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 45
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES
CHAPTER 5
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN
45-518. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND
MANNER. A mechanic 1 s lien of record upon real property may be released
upon the posting of a surety bond in the manner provided in sections 4551~ through 45-524, Idaho Code.
Hi.story:

[45-518, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 3, p. 1388.]

The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public
service. Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in
violation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho's
copyright.

http://legislature.idaho.gov/idstatITitle451T45CH5SECT45-518PrinterFriendly.htm
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 45
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES
CHAPTER 5
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN
45-519. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND - - FORM
OF BOND. The debtor of the lien claimant or a party in interest in the

premises subject to the lien must obtain a surety bond executed by the
debtor of the lien claimant or a party in interest in the premises subject
to the lien, as principal, and executed by a corporation authorized to
transact surety business in this state, as surety, in substantially the
following form:
(Title of court and cause, if action has been commenced)
WHEREAS,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. (name of owner, contractor, or other
person disputing the lien) desires to give a bond for releasing the
following described real property from that certain claim of mechanic's
1 ien in the sum of $ . . . . . . . . . . . , recorded ............... , .... , in the
of fice of the recorder in ....................... (name of county where
the real property is situated):
(legal description)
NOW,
THEREFORE,
the undersigned principal and surety do hereby
obligate themselves to ......................... , (name of claimant) the
claimant named in the mechanic's lien, under the conditions prescribed by
sections ~518 through 45-524, Idaho Code, inclusive, in the sum of
$ ....... (1-1/2 x claim), from which sum they will pay the claimant such
amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may adjudge to have been
secured by his lien, with interest, costs and attorney's fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the principal and surety have executed this bond
at ................... , Idaho, on the ......... day of ............ ,
(Signature of Principal)
(SURETY CORPORATION)
BY
(Its Attorney in Fact)
State of Idaho
) ss.
County of ........
)
On ............... , .... , before me, the undersigned, a notary public
of this county and state, personally appeared ....................... who
acknowledged that he executed the foregoing instrument as principal for
the
purposes
therein
mentioned
and
also
personally
appeared ....................... known (or satisfactorily proved) to me to
be the attorney in fact of the corporation that executed the foregoing
instrument and known to me to be the person who executed that instrument
on behalf of the corporation therein named, and he acknowledged to me that
that corporation executed the foregoing instrument.
(Notary Public in and for the
County and State)

http://legislaturejdaho.govlidstatITitle451T45CH5SECT45-519PrinterFriendly.htm
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 45
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES
CHAPTER 5
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN
45-520. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND
PETITION FOR RELEASE -- SERVICE OF COPY OF PETITION. (1) A petition for
the release of a mechanic's lien by posting a surety bond must be filed in
the district court of the county wherein the property is located and shall
set forth:
(a)
The title of the cause, thus: "In the matter of the petition
of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(name of petitioner)
for release of
mechanic's lien of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (name of mechanic's lien
claimant) upon posting surety bond."
(b) An allegation of the purchase of and payment of the premium for
the bond, and the dates of purchase and payment.
(c) An allegation incorporating by reference a true copy of the bond,
which copy must be attached to the petition.
(d)
The name or names of the owner or reputed owners of the land
subject to the lien.
(e) A description of the real property subject to the lien, and the
instrument number of the lien as given by the recorder's office.
(f) A prayer for an order releasing the lien.
(2)
The petitioner shall obtain an order from the district court
setting forth the time and date of the hearing on the petition" which time
and date must be at least five (5) days after the date of the order and
not more than ten (10) days after the date of the order.
(3) A copy of the petition and a copy of the order must be served on
the lien claimant at least two (2) days before the date set for the
hearing and served in the manner provided by law for service of summons.
History:

[45-520, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 5, p. 1389.J

The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public
service. Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in
via lation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho IS
copyright.
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 45
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES
CHAPTER 5
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN
45-521. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND
HEARING ON PETITION - - CONTENTS AND EFFECT OF ORDER RELEASING LIEN. (1)
Upon the hearing, the court shall enter its order releasing the mechanic's
lien upon the petitioner's filing in open court the original bond, and
introducing into evidence a receipt for payment of the premium.
(2)
The entry of the order by the court must refer to the property
which is the subj ect of the lien and the lien itself, by instrument
number, and must recite that the lien is released of record for all
purposes to the same extent as if released of record by the lienor.
(3)
Upon entry of the order, the lien is released of record in its
entirety and for all purposes and the real property, the subject of the
lien, is released from the encumbrances of the lien.
(4)
There is no appeal from the entry of an order pursuant to the
provisions of this section and upon entry the order is final for all
purposes.
History:
[45-521, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 6, p. 1390.]

The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 45
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES
CHAPTER 5
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN
45-522. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND -- ACTION
AGAINST DEBTOR AND SURETY -- PREFERENTIAL SETTINGS. (1) The lien claimant
is entitled to bring an action against the lien claimant's debtor and to
join therein the surety on the bond. The rights of the lien claimant
include and the court may award to him in that action:
(a) The amount found due to the lien claimant by the court;
(b) The cost of preparing and filing the lien claim, including
attorney's fees, if any;
(c) The costs of the proceedings;
(d) Attorney's fees for representation of the lien claimant in the
proceedings; and
(e)
Interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum on the
amount found due to the lien claimant and from the date found by the
court that the sum was due and payable.
(2)
Proceedings under subsection (1) of this section are entitled to
priority of hearing second only to criminal hearings. The plaintiff in the
action may serve upon the adverse party a "demand for thirty (30) day
setting" in the proper form, and file the demand with the clerk of the
court. Upon filing, the clerk of the court shall, before Friday next,
vacate a case or cases as necessary and set the lien claimant's case for
hearing, on a day or days certain, to be heard within thirty (30) days of
the filing of the "demand for thirty (30) day setting." Only one (1) such
preferential setting need be given by the court, unless the hearing date
is vacated without stipulation of counsel for the plaintiff in writing. If
the hearing date is vacated without that stipulation, upon service and
filing of a "demand for thirty (30) day setting," a new preferential
setting must be given.
History:

[45-522, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 7, p. 1390.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 45
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES
CHAPTER 5
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN
45-523. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND -- MOTION
ENFORCE LIABILITY OF SURETY. (1) By entering into a bond given pursuant
to section~'2-519,
Idaho Code,
the surety submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court in which the bond is filed in the proceeding for
release of the lien, and the surety irrevocably appoints the clerk of that
court as its agent upon whom any papers affecting its liability on the
bond may be served. Its liability may be enforced on motion without the
necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of motion
as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court, who shall
forthwith mail copies to the surety if his address is known.
(2) The motion described in subsection (1) of this section must not
be instituted until the lapse of thirty (30) days following the giving of
notice of entry of judgment in the action against the lien claimant I s
debtor, if no notice of appeal from the judgment is filed, nor may the
motion be instituted until the lapse of thirty (30) days following the
filing of the remittitur from the court of appeals or the supreme court,
if an appeal has been taken from the judgment.
TO

History:

[45-523, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 8, p. 1391.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 45
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES
CHAPTER 5
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN
45-524. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND
EXCEPTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF SURETY. (1) The lien claimant may, within two
(2) days after the service of a copy of the petition for release of the
lien with a copy of the bond attached thereto pursuant to section 45-5_~~O~,
Idaho Code, file with the clerk of the court in the action a notice
excepting to the sufficiency of the surety on the bond, and shall, at the
same time and together with that notice, file an affidavit setting forth
the grounds and basis of the exceptions to the surety, and shall serve a.
copy of the notice and a copy of the affidavit upon the attorney or the
petitioner on the same date as the date of filing of the notice and
affidavit. A hearing must be had upon the justification of the surety at
the same time as that set for the hearing on the petition for an order to
release the lien.
(2)
If the lien claimant fails to file and serve the notice and
affidavit within two (2) days after the service of the petition for
release of the lien, he shall be deemed to have waived all objection to
the justification and sufficiency of the surety.
History:
[45-524, added 1993, ch. 378,

sec. 9, p. 1391.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT

II

54-5201. SHORT TITLE. This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the
Idaho Contractor Registration Act."

History:

[54-5201, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 471.)
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5202. DECLARATION OF POLICY. The legislature finds and declares that
the practice of construction in the state of Idaho affects the public
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. The legislature further finds
that i t is in the public interest to provide a mechanism to remove from
practice
incompetent,
dishonest,
or
unprincipled
practitioners
of
construction. To aid in fulfilling these purposes, this chapter provides
for the registration of construction contractors within the state of
Idaho.
History:
[54-5202, added 2005,

ch. 153, sec.

I, p. 471.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5203. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter:
(1)
"Board" means the Idaho contractors board as created in section
54-5206, Idaho Code.
(2)
"Bureau chief" means the chief of the bureau of occupational
licenses.
(3)
"Construction" means the performance of building,
altering,
repairing, adding to, subtracting from, improving, reconstructing, moving,
excavating, wrecking or demolishing any building, highway, road, bridge,
or other structure, project, development or improvement to real property,
or to do any part thereof, including the erection of scaffolding or other
structures or works in connection therewith.
(4)
"Contractor" means:
(a) Any person who in any capacity undertakes, offers to undertake,
purports to have the capacity to undertake, or submits a bid to, or
does himself or by or through others, perform construction; or
(b) A construction manager who performs construction management
services.
(5)
"Department" means the department of self -governing agencies of
the state of Idaho.
(6)
"Person"
means
any
individual,
firm,
partnership,
limited
liability company,
limited liability partnership,
corporation,
trust,
association or other entity or organization capable of conducting
business, or any combination thereof acting as a unit.
History:

[54-5203, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 471.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5204. REGISTRATION REQUIRED. (1) On and after January 1, 2006, it
shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business of, or hold
himself out as, a contractor within this state without being registered as
required in this chapter.
(2)
It shall be unlawful for a contractor to engage any other
contractor who is required by this chapter to be registered as a
contractor unless such other contractor furnishes satisfactory proof to
the contractor that he is duly registered under the provisions of this
chapter.
(3) Any person who engages in the business or acts in the capacity of
a contractor, whether or not duly registered, has thereby submitted to the
jurisdiction of the state of Idaho and to the administrative jurisdiction
of the Idaho contractors board, and shall be subject to all penalties and
remedies available under Idaho law for any violation of this chapter.
History:

[54-5204, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 472.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5205. EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION. (1) Nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to restrict any person licensed, registered, or otherwise
regulated by the state of Idaho from engaging in the profession or
practice for which they are licensed, registered or otherwise regulated by
the state of Idaho including, but not limited to, persons licensed
pursuant to chapters 3, 10, 12, 19, 26, 45 and 50, title 54, Idaho Code,
nor shall this chapter require such persons otherwise licensed, registered
or regulated to obtain such registration as required by this chapter, so
long as such person is not acting with the intent to evade this chapter.
No such person exempt hereunder may hold himself out as a registered
contractor.
(2)
In addition to the exemption set forth in subsection (1) of this
section, registration as provided for in this chapter shall not be
required for the following, so long as such person is not acting with the
intent to evade this chapter and so long as such person does not hold
himself out as a registered contractor:
(a) A person who only performs labor or . services for wages or a
salary as an employee of a contractor, or as an employee of a person
otherwise exempt by the provisions set forth in this chapter, or
strictly as a volunteer or as part of a bona fide educational
curriculum or nonprofit charitable activity for which no wages or
salary shall be paid; provided however, that such exemption shall not
apply to any subcontractor or other independent contractor who is not
otherwise exempt;
(b) An authorized representative of the United States government, the
state of Idaho, or any incorporated municipality, county, alternative
form of local government, highway district, reclamation district, or
other municipal or political corporation or subdivision of this state;
(c) A public utility operating under the regulation of the Idaho
public utility commission as set forth in t~tl~l, Idaho Code, in the
construction, maintenance, or development work incidental to its own
business;
(d) A person who performs repair or operation incidental to the
discovery or production of oil, gas or minerals or incidental to the
drilling, testing, abandoning, or other operation of an oil or gas
well or a surface or underground mine or mineral deposit;
(e) A person who only furnishes materials, supplies or equipment
without that person installing or fabricating them into or consuming
them in the performance of the work of the construction contractor;
(f) A person performing work on one (1) undertaking or project
cons idered casual, minor, or inconsequent ial, whether by one (1) or
more contracts, the aggregate contract price of which, for labor and
materials and all other items, is less than two thousand dollars
($2,000). The exemptions prescribed in this paragraph (f) shall not
apply when the work or construction is part of a larger construction
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project, whether undertaken by the same or a different construction
contractor, or in which a division of the operation is made into
contracts of amounts of less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) for
the purpose of evasion of this chapter or otherwise;
(g)
A farmer or rancher while engaged in a farming,
dairying,
agriculture, viticulture, horticulture, or stock or poultry operation;
(h) A person who engages in the construction of an agriculture
building which is exempt from the Idaho building code act as set forth
in section 39-4116, Idaho Code;
(i)
An irrigation district, canal company, reservoir district, ground
water district, water district, water measurement district, recharge
district, flood control district, drainage district, or other water
delivery or water management entity,
or an operating agent of
irrigation districts whose board consists of directors of its member
districts;
(j) An operation related to clearing or other work upon land in rural
districts for fire prevention purposes;
(k)
An owner who contracts for work to be performed by a registered
contractor on his own property, provided however, this exemption shall
not apply to an owner who, with the intent to evade this chapter,
constructs abuilding, residence or other improvement on the owner's
property with the intention and for the purpose of selling the
improved property at any time during the construction or within twelve
(12) months of completion of such construction;
(1)
An
owner
performing
construction
on
the
owner's
personal
residential real property, whether or not occupied by the owner,
provided however, this exemption shall not apply to an owner who is
otherwise regulated by this chapter who constructs a building,
residence or other improvement on the owner's property with the
intention and for the purpose of promptly selling the improved
property, unless the owner has continuously occupied the property as
the owner's primary residence for not less than twelve (12) months
prior to the sale of such property;
(m)
Owners
of commercial properties,
or lessees
of
commercial
properties with the consent of the owner, who, whether themselves or
with their own employees, perform maintenance, repair, alteration or
construction work in or upon the properties;
(n)
A real estate licensee acting within the scope of his license
pursuant to chapter 20, title 54, Idaho Code, who, incident to a
regulated real estate transaction, assists his clients in scheduling
or performing nominal maintenance and repairs upon such properties
being transferred; provided however, nothing in this section shall
otherwise authorize a real estate licensee or a property manager to
act in the capacity of a contractor unless registered with the board;
(0)
A contractor engaged in the logging industry who builds forest
access roads for the purpose of harvesting and transporting logs from
forest to mill;
(p) A person working on the person's own residence, if the residence
is owned by a person other than the resident;
(q) A person who engages in the construction of buildings to be used
primarily for industrial chemical process purposes as set forth in
section 39-4103, Idaho Code; or
(r)
A person who engages in the construction of a modular building as
defined in section 39-4301, Idaho Code, that is constructed in the
state of Idaho for installation on a building site outside the state.
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5206. IDAHO CONTRACTORS BOARD. (1) The Idaho contractors board is
hereby created and made a part of the bureau of occupational licenses. It
shall be the responsibility and duty of the bureau chief to administer
this chapter, and the bureau chief shall exercise such powers and duties
as are reasonably necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter. The
board may promulgate such rules as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter in order to effectuate the purposes herein and
for the orderly and efficient administration thereof, except as may be
limited or prohibited by law and the provisions of this chapter.
(2)
The board shall consist of four (4) members who are contractors,
and one (1) member of the public at large, all of whom shall be appointed
by the governor as follows: one (1) contractor from the northern district
consisting of Idaho,
Lewis,
Nez Perce,
Clearwater,
Latah,
Benewah,
Boundary, Shoshone, Kootenai and Bonner counties; one (1) contractor from
the southeastern district consisting of Lemhi, Butte, Clark, Fremont,
Jefferson,
Madison,
Teton,
Bonneville,
Bingham,
Caribou,
Bear Lake,
Franklin, Oneida, Power and Bannock counties; one (1) contractor from the
southwestern district consisting of Owyhee, Elmore, Ada, Canyon, Boise,
Gem, Payette, Washington, Adams and Valley counties; one (1) contractor
from the south central district consisting of Blaine, Camas, Cassia,
Custer, Gooding, Jerome, Lincoln, Minidoka and Twin Falls counties; and
one (1) member of the public at large who resides in the state of Idaho
and is a person of integrity and good reputation who has lived in this
state for at least five (5) years immediately preceding appointment, who
has never been registered as a contractor in this or another state, and
who has never had a substantial personal, business, professional or
pecuniary connection with a contractor except as a purchaser or owner of
real property.
(3)
Each member of the board who is a contractor shall serve a term
of four (4) years and such terms shall be staggered. The initial board
shall have one (1) ~ember whose term expires July I, 2007; one (1) member
whose term expires July 1, 2008; one (1) member whose term expires July 1,
2009; and one (1) member whose term shall expire July I, 2010. The member
of the board who is a member of the public at large shall serve a four (4)
year term, which initial term shall expire on July I, 2008. No member of
the board may be appointed to more than two (2) consecutive terms.
(4)
The board shall meet
within thirty
(30)
days
after the
appointment of all its members and thereafter at such other times as may
be expedient and necessary for the proper performance of its duties, but
not less than once during each calendar quarter. At the board s first
meeting, the members shall elect one (1) of their number to be chairman.
The chairman may serve in such capacity for a one (1) year term and may
not serve in such capacity for more than two (2) consecutive terms. A
majority of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business.
I
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(5) The board may delegate to the bureau chief:
(a) The power to perform ministerial functions,
investigate and
discipline, hold hearings, appoint hearing officers, summon witnesses
to appear, administer oaths and take affirmations of witnesses at any
formal proceeding or before a duly appointed hearing officer;
(b) The power to appoint competent persons to issue subpoenas,
administer oaths and take testimony; and
(c) The power to enforce orders of the board.
(6)
Each member of the board shall be compensated as provided by
section 59-509(n), Idaho Code.
(7) On and after January I, 2006, each member of the board who is a
contractor shall be registered in accordance with this chapter and shall
be in good standing.
History:
l,

[54-5206, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. I, p. 474; am. 2008, ch. 107, sec.
p. 304.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5207. GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE BOARD. The board shall enforce
the minimum standards and requirements therefor as provided by this
chapter and by rule adopted by the board. The board may exercise such
powers and duties as are reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions
of this chapter and it may, among other things:
(1) Accept or reject applications for registration and establish the
fees to be charged for application, registration and renewal, subject to
the provisions of this chapter;
(2) Hold public meetings and attend or be represented at such
meetings,
within or without the state,
prepare and publish rules
pertaining to this chapter and such other information as may be necessary,
and furnish copies thereof to those engaged in the business, trade,
practice or work of contracting and to the public upon request;
(3)
Furnish standards and procedures and prescribe reasonable rules
for
applications,
qualifications
and
registration
of
contractors,
including proration of registration fees and staggering initial annual
registration; and
(4)
Under such rules as it may adopt, investigate, classify and
determine the qualifications of applicants for registration pursuant to
this chapter; and
(5)
Contract with the bureau of occupational licenses to provide
administrative services.
Hi.story:

[54-5207, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 475.J
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5208. DENIAL OF LIEN RIGHTS. A contractor who is not registered as set
forth in this chapter, unless otherwise exempt, shall be denied and shall
be deemed to have conclusively waived any right to place a lien upon real
property as provided for in chapter 5, title 45, Idaho Code. This section
shall not operate as a denial of lien rights for any subcontractor or
independent contractor who is duly registered in accordance with this
chapter and who is performing services at the direction of another
contractor, nor shall it operate as a denial of lien rights for any
employee of any contractor who is not duly registered, or for any supplier
of
materials
to
such
unregistered
contractor,
so
long
as
such
subcontractor, independent contractor, employee or supplier did not have
actual knowledge that such contractor was not duly registered, or who
reasonably believed that such contractor was duly registered.
History:

[54-5208, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 476.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5209. BUILDING PERMITS AND CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION NUMBER -- POSTING
(I) On and after January 1, 2006, no building inspector or such
other authority of any county, municipality or district charged with the
duty of issuing building permits or other permits for construction of any
type shall issue any permit without first requesting presentment of an
Idaho contractor's registration number. Such registration number presented
shall be conspicuously entered on the face of a permit so issued; provided
however, a permit may be issued to a person otherwise exempt from the
provisions of this chapter provided such permit shall conspicuously
contain the phrase "no contractor registration provided" on the face of
such permit. No authority charged with the duty of issuing such permit
shall be required to verify that the person applying for such permit is
exempt as provided in this chapter.
(2)
All building permits or other permits for construction of any
type shall be posted at the construction site in such a manner that the
conspicuous statements set forth in subsection (I) of this section are
visible.
(3)
No person engaged in construction activities who is otherwise
exempt as set forth in section 54-520~, Idaho Code, shall be required to
have a contractor registration number.
AT SITE.

History:
[54-5209, added 2005,

ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 476.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5210. APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION. (1) An applicant for registration
as a contractor shall submit an application under oath upon a form to be
prescribed by the board and which shall include the following information
pertaining to the applicant:
(a)
Social security number for natural persons or employer tax
identification number for other persons;
(b)
The name and address under which the applicant conducts business;
(c)
The name and address
of each principal,
member,
partner,
shareholder, or any other person claiming an ownership interest in the
business entity for which registration is being applied for;
(d) A certificate issued by an insurance company authorized to do
business in the state of Idaho or other satisfactory proof that the
applicant has procured and has in effect worker's compensation
insurance or a statement by the contractor as to why such certificate
or coverage is not required for the applicant;
(e) A certificate issued by an insurance company authorized to do
business in the state of Idaho that the applicant has procured and has
in effect a general liability policy, including products and completed
operations insurance covering the applicant's construction operations
in the sum of not less than three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000)
single limit. The name of the insurance company, the insured and
policy number shall be made available only to persons or their
insurers stating that they possess a claim against the contractor;
(f) A statement of the type of construction to be undertaken by the
applicant, or such other information as may be required by the board
pursuant to administrative rules adopted by the board; and
(g) A statement that the applicant and each principal, member,
partner,
shareholder or any other person claiming an ownership
interest in the business entity for which registration is being
applied for herein has never been denied, surrendered or had revoked a
contractor's license or registration privilege in this or any other
state or, if a license or registration privilege has been denied,
surrendered or revoked in this or any other state, an explanation of
any such denial, surrender or revocation.
(2) Along with such application,
the applicant shall submit a
registration fee as may be set by the board to cover its administrative
and enforcement costs, not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars ($150) per
year.
(3) An application for registration that has been denied by the board
shall be considered a contested case as provided for in chapter 52, title
67, Idaho Code, and shall be subject to the provisions of that chapter as
well as the administrative rules adopted by the board governing contested
cases.
History:
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54 -5211. REGISTRATION - - RENEWAL. A registration shall be issued for a
period of not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, as
determined by the board. Each registration shall set forth its expiration
date on the face of the certificate. No less than thirty (30) days prior
to the expiration of
such registration,
the board shall notify a
registered
contractor
that
such
registration
is
set
to
expire.
Reinstatement of a lapsed registration shall require the payment of a
renewal fee and reinstatement fee in accordance with the administrative
rules adopted by the board. The failure of any registered contractor to
renew his registration as required herein and by the administrative rules
of the board shall not deprive such person of the right to renewal upon
subsequent application for registration and payment of the required board
fees.

History:
[54-5211, added 2005,

ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 477.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5212. DISPOSITION OF RECEIPTS -- EXPENSES. All fees received under the
provisions of this chapter shall be paid to the bureau of occupational
licenses and deposited in the state treasury to the credit of the
occupational licenses fund and all costs and expenses incurred under the
provisions of this chapter shall be a charge against and paid from said
fund.
History:

[54-5212, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 477.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5213. RECIPROCAL REGISTRATION. (1) On and after January 1, 2007, no
incorporated municipality, county, al ternati ve form of local government,
or other municipal or political corporation or subdivision of this state
shall implement its own program for the registration or licensure of
construction contractors.
(2)
A contractor may provide a verified copy of any current and
unrestricted license, registration, or other type of certification granted
to the contractor by any incorporated municipality, county, alternative
form of local government, or other municipal or political corporation or
subdivision of this state issued pursuant to a duly adopted and enacted
ordinance prior to January 1, 2007, to the board for review, along with a
reciprocal registration fee not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00), as
determined by board rule, which is necessary for the administration and
processing of such application. If the review indicates that the license,
registration or certification was granted under provisions that were not
less stringent than those provided by this chapter, the applicant shall be
issued a registration based upon reciprocal registration.
History:
[54-5213, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 478; am. 2007, ch. 183, sec.
1, p. 531.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5214. REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE -- DISPLAY. (1) Upon receipt of a duly
completed application, together with the registration fee, and after such
verification process as the board may from time to time deem appropriate
by rule, a certificate of registration and a wallet-sized card showing the
registrant (s name and showing a registration number shall be issued,
commencing on the date of issue and continuing in effect for a period of
not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, as determined by
the board. Application for renewal of registration shall be filed on or
before thirty (30) days prior to the expiration date. The board shall
issue a certificate of registration to an applicant upon the applicant (s
compliance
with
the
registration
requirements
of
this
chapter.
Certificates shall not be assignable nor transferable. Upon any change of
ownership or a change of address of a registered contractor entity, the
board shall be notified by such entity within thirty (30)
days. A
certificate of registration, without the payment of a registration fee,
shall be issued to any person who is granted a public works contractor
license or a construction manager license, so long as those requirements
for licensure in Idaho are met.
(2)
A
contractor
registered
pursuant
to
this
chapter
shall
prominently display his contractor registration number for public view in
his place of business, on advertising, contracts, permits, company or
business letterheads, and purchase orders and subcontracts within sixty
(60) days of issue of registration.
History:
[54-5214, added 2005,

ch. 153, sec. I, p. 478.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5215. AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE
SUSPENSION OR
REVOCATION OF REGISTRATION. (1) The board may investigate any person
engaged in contracting within the state of Idaho, or any person believed
to have acted as a contractor without being duly registered as required by
this chapter. Upon receipt of a written complaint from a person who claims
to have been injured or defrauded by such person, or upon information
received by the board, the board shall perform an investigation of the
facts alleged against such person. If the board investigation reveals that
the facts alleged or received are sufficient to proceed with a formal
action, the board may authorize the filing of an administrative complaint
against such person and may seek injunctive relief prohibiting such person
f rom engaging in construction.
(2)
The board shall have the authority to issue informal letters of
reprimand, suspend or revoke a registration, impose a civil penalty in an
amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), recover the costs and
fees incurred in an investigation and prosecution, or to issue a formal
reprimand against any registered contractor if, after an opportunity for a
hearing, the board determines that:
(a)
A contractor has violated any of the provisions of this chapter
including, but not limited to, failure to keep current or provide
insurance coverage as required by this chapter;
(b)
A contractor has violated any of the provisions of chapte1='~E.iL
titJ~_~,
Idaho Code, relating to consumer protection including, but
not limited to, making fraudulent misrepresentations to consumers;
(c) A
contractor
employed
fraud
or
deception,
made
a
misrepresentation or misstatement, or employed any unlawful means in
applying for or securing registration as a contractor;
(d) A
contractor
employed
fraud
or
deception,
made
a
misrepresentation or misstatement, or employed any unlawful means in
applying for or securing a building permit or other permits for
construction of any type;
(e)
A contractor failed to pay the required fee for registration as
provided in this chapter;
(f)
A contractor has been convicted of or has engaged in conduct
constituting a violation of public laws, ordinances or rules of this
state, or any subdivision thereof, relevant to contracting, reflecting
on the registered contractor IS ability or qualifications to continue
contracting for other persons, and making the registered contractor a
threat to the public safety, health or well-being;
(g)
A contractor has engaged in any other conduct whether of the same
or a different character than hereinabove specified which constitutes
dishonest or dishonorable dealings;
(h)
A contractor was grossly negligent or reckless in his conduct in
the performance of construction. For purposes of this chapter, conduct
is grossly negligent or reckless if, when taken as a whole, it is
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conduct which substantially fails to meet the generally accepted
standard of care in the practice of construction in Idaho;
(i) A contractor had a
license,
registration or certification
revoked, suspended or refused by this or another state, territory,
incorporated
municipality,
county,
alternative
form
of
local
government, or other municipal or political corporation or subdivision
of this or another state, or omitted such information from any
application to the board, or failed to divulge such information when
requested by the board;
(j) A contractor has been adjudged mentally incompetent by a court of
competent jurisdiction; or
(k) A contractor interfered with an investigation or disciplinary
proceeding by a willful misrepresentation of facts or by the use of
threats or harassment against any person to prevent such person from
providing evidence in a disciplinary proceeding, investigation or
other legal action instituted in accordance with this chapter.
(3) A contractor whose registration has been revoked or suspended
shall be required to return his certificate of registration within the
time determined by the board or, upon a failure to do so, shall be liable
for civil penalties as set by the board but not to exceed fifty dollars
($50.00) per day for each day the certificate is not returned after the
expiration of the period allowed.
(4)
The
suspension or
revocation of
a
registration
shall be
considered a contested case as provided for in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho
Code, and shall be subject to the provisions of that chapter as well as
the administrative rules adopted by the board governing contested cases.
History:

[54-5215, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 478.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5216. REINSTATEMENT OF REGISTRATION AFTER DISCIPLINE. The board may
reinstate a suspended or revoked registration upon a showing that:
(1) The
grounds
for
such suspension or
revocation have
been
eliminated;
(2)
Such a violation is not likely to reoccur in the future; and
(3)
The public interest is not jeopardized by reinstating the
registration.
History:

[54-5216, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. I, p. 480.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5217. PENALTIES. (1 ) Any person acting in the capacity of a contractor
wi thin the meaning of this chapter without a current registration as
herein required shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall,
upon
conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not to exceed one thousand
dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to
exceed six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.
(2) No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a
contractor, unless otherwise exempt, may bring or maintain any action in
any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the
performance of any act or contract for which registration is required by
this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly registered
contractor, or that he was otherwise exempt as provided for in this
chapter, at all times during the performance of such act or contract.
History:

[54-5217, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 480.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5218. ATTORNEY GENERAL -- PROSECUTING ATTORNEY. It shall be the right
and duty of the attorney general or the prosecuting attorneys of the
various counties to represent and appear for the people of the state of
Idaho and the department in all actions and proceedings involving any
question under this chapter or under any order or act of the board and to
perform such other services as are required.
History:

[54-5218, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 480.]
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 54
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 52
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT
54-5219. SEVERABILITY. The provisions of this chapter are hereby declared
to be severable and if any provision of this chapter or the application of
such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any
reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining
portions of this chapter.
Hi.story:

[54-5219, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 480.]
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HOUSE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

.iIi
DATE:

February 16, 1993

TDfE:

8:30 A.M.

PLACE:

Statehouse. Room 412

PRESENT:

Chairman Ahrens, Vice Chairman Deal, Representatives
Alexander, Berain, Crane, Danielson, Judd, King, Lance,
Loertscher,
Newcomb,
Stennett,
Stoicheff,
Stone,
Sutton, Tippets, Vandenberg and Wood

r

f

.

o

ti
Ii

t

"

ABSENT!
EXCUSED:

None

CUESTS:

See Attached List

The Chairman called to meeting to order at 8:40 A.M.
MOTION:

Rep. Wood Iloved, seconded by Rep. Danielson, to approve
the minutes from the meeting held on February 15, 1993
as written. Motion carries.

RS 02341

Rep. Max Black asked the committee to print RS 02341.

MOTION:

Rep. Crane moved, seconded by Rep. Deal, to send to
print. RS 02341 with the recommendation that it be
sent to the Business Committee. Motion carries.

RS 02503·

Rep. Stennett said this was brought to his attention
for the lack of a mechanism to title watercraft . It is
protection for the consumer and lender. It will provide
clear knowledge of ownership.

MOTION:

Rep. Deal moved, seconded by Rep. Danielson. to send to
print RS 02S03 with the recommendation that it be sent
to Mr. Speaker. Motion carries.

RS 02510

Rep. Stennett said there is no provision for titling
truck campers ~ " The same argument applies, no way of
establishing a clear trail of ownership to those
calipers.

MOTION:

Rep. Wood moved, seconded by Rep. Judd, to send to
print RS 02510 with the recomllendation that it be sent
to Transportati"on Committee. Motion carries.

~S

r

Rep. Stubbs said the first part of the bill is simple.
If you are "a contractor or supplier, you have 60 days
in which to file a lien after the last day you render
service.
If you are a general contractor. you have 90
days. Usually a lien is only filed if compensation for
materials and service is in jeopardy.
The second half
is one that eliminates the possibility for lawsuits.
It allows someone who is grieved by a lien to post a
bond and bond around the lien. In essence you start an
action, you go into court because you have to have
somebody look at the bond to make sure it is a
legitimate bond. that the lien creditor is ad~quately
protected by putting the bond as security instead of a
lien on the house.

Ii

A brief
made.

0252"0

~

MOTION:

I
II

il
t:
II

'"

discussion

ensued

after which

a

motion was

Rep. Crane moved. seconded by Rep. King, to send to
print RS 02529 with the recoMmendation to send it to
Business Committee. Motion carries.

o

o

COMMITTEE MINUTES
1993
"

.'

8,
the
sub-committee
will
review
the
advisory
committee.
It is the intent of the chair to address a
recommendation of Tuesday, March 9.
Kay Manweiler, Occupational Licensing Board, addressed
the committee regarding protective orders and subpoena
powers addres-sed in HB 63, dealing with the Accountancy
Act.
Ms. Manweiler addressed these concerns out of
order of the listed bills, as she would not be
available to address the Bub-committee later in the
day.
Ms. Manweiler explained the protective order
seeks to clothe a witness from disclosure when
necessary.
Bob Corbell, Idaho Association of Contractors, spoke to
the committee on HB 305. Mr. Corbell explained HB 305
extends
the
deadline
for
filing
a
lien
for
subcontractors and material suppliers to 90 days from
60 days previously, making i t consistent with general
contractors.
This will allow all parties 90 days,
instead of having some at 60 days and others at 90.
Repre~entative

Deal made a motion to send HB 305 to the
floor with a do pass recommendation.
Motion seconded
by Representation Taylor.
Motion passed unanimously.
Representatives Stubbs and Deal will sponsor the bill.
Representatives Stubbs presented HB 195 with amendments
that have been drafted to accompany the bill.
HB 195
dealB with employee leasing companies that operate in
IdahO.

'.

,- '~ ."

Representative Deal liIade a motion to send HB 195 to
General Orders for amendment.
Motion seconded by
Representative Jones.
Motion passed unanimously.
Representative Stubbs will sponsor UB 195.
Bob
Corbell,
Idaho
Association
of
Contractors,
presented UB 239.
HB - 239 will help generate business
for in-state vendors who supply goods or services to
state institutions by giving them an advantage over
out -of-state vendors equal to two percent of the bid
value or to the amount of a similar preference given to
the in-state vendors of another state, whichever is
greater.
The question arose as to the retaliatory
action surrounding states might take.
Alan Fitzgerald, Executive Director of Buy Idaho,
encouraged passage of the bill to keep the economy
flowing in-state.
Motion seconded by Representative
Flandro.
Motion passed with Representative Stennett
voting nay.
There being no further business before the committee,
meeting was adjourned at 3:45 p.m.

'.

lON CRANE, CHAIRMAN
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RECEIVEO

FEB 0 3 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI<ffB

'viOhi'; I, ::-((Jt','AS, BARREll.
i(( lei-(

& FIELDS, CHTD

02 2011

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CHWTOPHER D. RICH. CIenc
By DIANE OATMAN
~

PROWALL DRYWALL &
INSULATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.
PLAINRIDGE, LLC, an Idaho limited
Liability company, et at,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2009-01225
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER RE:WELLS
FARGO'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PROWALL DRYWALL
& INSULATION, INC.

---------------------------))
BUCHANAN CONSTRUCTION IDAHO,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RED CLIFF DEVELOPMENT, INC., an
Idaho corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2009-02055

)

TERRA-WEST, INC., an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL R. REILY, an individual, et aI.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2009-07052

)

Defendants.

)

-------------------------------))
WESTERN NEV ADA SUPPLY CO., a
Nevada corporation
Plainti ff,

~

)
)
)
)

McmorandumDccisionAndOrdcrRe:MotionforSummaryJudgment I

Case No. CV-OC-2009-03777

vs.

)
)
BRlAN SMITH, an individual, d/b/a APEX;
)
PLAINRIDGE SUBDIVISION, LLC, an Idaho )
limited liability company, et aI.,
)
)

)

Defendants.

----------------------------))
LLOYD LUMBER COMPANY, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Lori SWAIN, an individual, et aI.,
Defendants.

)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2009-04590

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

------------------------------)
LBACKGROUND
Presently pending before the Court is a motion filed on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank,
NA (Wells Fargo) seeking summary judgment against Prowall Drywall & Insulation, Inc.
(prowall). In support of its motion, Wells Fargo makes three claims: (1) that Prowall was
precluded from filing liens on the lots that are the subject of this litigation because it hired
unregistered contractors to perform work on the lots; (2) that Prowall is jurisdictionally barred
from making a claim to one of the lots because it failed to list Wells Fargo's predecessor-ininterest's interest in one of the lots in Prowall's complaint; and (3) that Prowall is barred from
raising new facts that would create an issue of fact because it relies on information that was
untimely disclosed to Wells Fargo.
This action arises out of a contract dispute between Prowall and Plainridge, LLC.
Plainridge hired Prowall to provide labor and materials in the construction of several
condominiums at Plainridge Place, including Lots 9 and to. In April 2008, Prowall, with the

Mcmo11lndumDecision AndOrderRe: Motion ForSu mmaryJudgment2

assistance of two subcontractors, Rancho Drywall, a then-unregistered contractor, and B&J
Drywall & Cleaning, LLC, commenced work by "pre-rocking" the condominiums. Following
framing inspections in June 2008, Prow all began hanging sheet rock, taping, and mudding. By
June 17, 2008, Prow all and its subcontractors had completed their work on Lots 9 and 10.
Claiming it was still owed money for labor and material supplied under its contract with
Plainridge, subsequently Prowall filed liens against Lots 9 and 10 on July 21, 2008. On May
21, 2008, after the pre-rocking, but before the hanging of sheetrock, Wells Fargo's
predecessor-in-interest recorded deeds of trust to Lots 9 and 10.
On July 21, 2008, Prowall filed lien claims to Lots 9 and 10 with the statutorily
required contents. Approximately six months later, it commenced this action, naming, among
others, Wells Fargo's predecessor-in-interest in its complaint.

In its complaint, Prowall

provided the legal description of the two lots it was seeking to foreclose and attached the lien
claims to the complaint. However, the complaint failed to name Wells Fargo's interest in Lot
9, naming only its interest in Lot 10.
II. ANALYSIS
Summary judgment may be entered when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.CP.
56{c); see also Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 375, 3 P.3d 51, 53 (2000). In a summary
judgment conext, the moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007).
However, the non-moving party "cannot rest on mere speCUlation because a mere scintilla of
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,820

McmomndumDecisionAndOrderRe:MolionForSummaryJudgmenl3

P.2d 360, 364 (1991). The non-moving party may not rely on bare allegations or denials; it
must set forth specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact. Vebillis v. Dependable
Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,689 P.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1984). However, the disputed fucts are

construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences drawn from
those facts are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. BMC West, 144 Idaho at 893, 174
P.3d at 402.
A. Statutory Penalties for Hiring Unregistered Contractors
In Idaho, it is "unlawful for any person to engage in the business of ... a contractor ...

without being registered ... " with the Idaho Contractors Board. I.e. § 54-5204(1). Idaho law
also makes it "unlawful for a contractor to engage any other contractor who is required ... to
be registered as a contractor unless such other contractor furnishes satisfactory proof to the
contractor that he is duly registered . . . ." I.e. § 54-5204(2). A contractor that does not
register as required is "deemed to have conclusively waived any right to place a lien upon real
property" under the mechanic's lien statute. I.C. § 54-5208. Oddly, section 5208 makes clear
that it does not deny the rights of a registered "subcontractor or independent contractor ...
who is performing services at the direction of another contractor who is not duly registered ...
so long as such subcontractor [or] independent contractor ... did not have actual knowledge
that such contractor was not duly registered." Jd.

Furthermore, a contractor that fails to

register may not "bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for the collection of
compensation for the performance of any contract for which registration is required .... " I.C.
§ 54-5217(2).
Prowall argues that these statutes, read together, do not deny the rights of a registered
contractor that unknowingly hires an unregistered contractor. Its first contention is that the
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statute denying lien rights applies only to contractors who are unregistered, and thus cannot be
applied to registered contractors on the basis of their hiring unregistered subcontractors. It
argues that because Prowall was a registered contractor at all times during the construction, it
is entitled to a lien. Prowall further argues that even if the statute applies to contractors who
hire unregistered subcontractors, a claim is permissible once the previously unregistered
subcontractor registers. Prow all cites a recent Idaho case to support the proposition that the
statute only bars recovery by contractors that are unlicensed at the time of commencing an
action. This court is not persuaded by either of Prow all's arguments.
Whether Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to the hiring of unregistered subcontractors is
an issue of first impression.

When engaging in statutory interpretation, this Court must

attempt to give meaning and effect to all the provisions of a statute. Bradbury v. Idaho
Judicial Counsel, 149 Idaho 107, 116, 233 P.3d 38, 47 (2009). The Court will not presume

that the legislature enacted superfluous statutes, and the Court will not make surplusage of
provisions of the statute. Id. At the outset, it is worth noting that whether Prowall knew
Rancho was unregistered is irrelevant. The statute requires that a contractor not engage a
subcontractor unless the subcontractor provides satisfactory proof that it was registered. Thus,
the statute creates an affirmative duty on the part of the contractor to verify the registratiQn
status of a subcontractor prior to engaging it. Therefore, Prowall's lack of knowledge of
Rancho's registration status is a failure of that duty, and it is irrelevant whether Prowall was
aware that Rancho was unregistered.
As to the issue of whether Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to registered contractors that
engage unregistered subcontractors, this Court finds that they do apply. The first sentence of
Section 5208, if read in a vacuum, would apparently operate to deny lien rights only to
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unregistered contractors, and thus all registered contractors would have lien rights. However,
that interpretation would render meaningless other parts of the statute. The most glaring is the
first clause of the second sentence in the statute, which states that the statute will not operate
to deny the rights of registered contractors operating at the direction of unregistered
contractors.

If the first sentence were to strictly apply only to unregistered contractors

themselves, that clause would be utterly without meaning, as it only guarantees that lien rights
will not be denied to a subset of registered contractors, which would not have their rights
denied anyway.
The second part of Chapter 52 that would be rendered virtually meaningless would be
proscription of hiring unregistered contractors. Section 5204 specifically makes it unlawful to
engage a subcontractor without receiving proof that the subcontractor was registered. If there
were no penalties applied for violating that provision, it would render "unlawful" virtually
meaningless. This Court must apply the law in such a way as to give effect to all statutory
provisions.

If this Court were to decline to apply the penalty provision to registered

contractors who hire unregistered contractors, it would render several provisions of this statute
meaningless.

Thus, this Court finds that penalties of Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to

registered contractors that engage unregistered contractors.
As previously noted, Prowall argues that even under this interpretation of Chapter 52,
it is not barred from filing its lien claims or commencing this action since Ranchero registered
Prowall filed its lien claims or commenced this action. Prowall relies on Parkwest Homes,
LLC v. Bamson, arguing that the case stands for the proposition that Section 5208 only bars

lien claims by contractors that are unregistered at the time of the claim. 149 Idaho 603, _ ,
238 P.3d 203, 208 (2010). In that case, a contractor entered into a construction contract prior
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to registering. Id. Prior to furnishing any labor, the contractor registered. Id. There, the court
held that a contractor may claim a lien for any work that it performs while registered, and none
of the work it performs while it is not. Id. Thus, a contractor must be registered at the time
labor is furnished to be able to claim a lien for the labor. Since the penalties of Chapter 52
apply to registered contractors that hire unregistered subcontractors, any lien claims arising
while the unregistered subcontractor is employed are conclusively waived, and no action may
be brought for collection of debts owed on the labor. Since there is no disagreement that
Rancho was unregistered throughout all the work performed by Prowall on the Plainridge
Place Condominiums, Prowall's lien claims and action to collect are barred.
B. Jurisdictional Bar to Prowall's Claim on Lot 9

In Idaho, a mechanic's lien claimant must commence its action to enforce its lien
within six months after filing its lien claim.

I.C. § 45-510.

If an action to enforce a

mechanic's lien is not commenced within six months after the lien claim is filed, the lien
ceases to exist and the court loses jurisdiction to enforce the lien. Bradford v. Palmer, 86
Idaho 395, 401, 388 P.2d 96, 99 (1963). Thus, whether this Court is barred from enforcing
Prowall's lien will tum on whether Prowall's complaint was adequate to commence an action
to enforce its lien on Lot 9. Wells Fargo argues that Prowall has failed to commence its action
on Lot 9 within the required six months because Prowall failed to name Wells Fargo's interest
in Lot 9 in its complaint. This Court disagrees with Wens Fargo's contention.
Contrary to Wells Fargo's argument that Idaho law requires the complaint to list each
party's interest, "[t]he key issue in detennining the validity of a complaint is whether the
adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought against it." Vendlin v. Costeo Wholesale
Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 427, 95 P.3d 34, 45 (2004). Here, Wells Fargo's predecessor-in-interest
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was named in the complaint, as well as its deed of trust in Lot 10. Attached to the complaint
were Prowall's lien claims to both Lots 9 and 10, which contained what is statutorily required.
The complaint contained a legal description of the property Prowall was seeking to foreclose
on, and it requested in its prayer for relief a judgment foreclosing its claims of lien on Lots 9
and 10. The complaint was timely filed. This Court finds that Wells Fargo was put on notice,
and thus Prowall's action to enforce its lien on Lot 9 was commenced within six months.
C. Lien Priority and Prowall's Discovery Violation
Finally, Wells Fargo argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to when
Prowall began its work. Prowall claims that it engaged in "pre-rocking" work in April 2008,
before Wells Fargo recorded its deeds of trust. Wells Fargo claims that Prowall did not begin
work until June 2008 at earliest.

Wells Fargo argues that the affidavit of Ken Rich and

attached documents, produced December 30, 2010, contradict Mr. Rich's previous testimony,
and was produced in violation of LR.C.P. 26(e) and this Court's scheduling order. Wells
Fargo argues that the documents and affidavit should be ignored to the extent that they
contradict Mr. Rich's deposition testimony that Prowall began work after framing inspections
in June 2008. This Court disagrees.
Whether to exclude testimony or evidence based on a violation of Rule 26(e) is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Schmechel v. Dille,148 Idaho 176,219
P.3d 1192 (2009). This Court is unwilling to exclude evidence disclosed in violation of a
scheduling order absent a showing that the late disclosure prejudiced a party. Here, Wells
Fargo does not contend that it has been prejudiced in any way by the late disclosure of the
documents. Thus, this Court will not exclude the documents or the information contained in
the affidavit of Ken Rich.
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Since the documents and affidavit contain evidence that Prowall began its work on the
Plainridge Place Condominiums in April 2008, and Wells Fargo did not record its deeds of
trust until May 2008, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to which interest has priority.
Since there is a genuine issue of material fact, this Court will not grant summary judgment on
the theory that Wells Fargo's liens have superior priority.
In. CONCLUSION
The Wells Fargo lien is superior to the Prowall claim since Prowall failed to meet the
specific requirements of the statute required to preserve its lien right; it engaged an
unregistered contractor to perform the work, thus forfeiting any lien it might otherwise have
claimed or possessed.

Thus, Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment is hereby

GRANTED. Since Wells Fargo has made no showing of prejudice stemming from Prowall's
late disclosure of documents, this Wells Fargo's motion to strike and disregard testimony and
documents is hereby DENIED. Wells Fargo shall prepare a judgment for this Court to sign in
accordance with this decision and I.R.C.P. 54(a).
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS z,....!dayofFebruary, 2011.
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